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EMERGING ALTERNATIVES TO MUTUAL
FUNDS: UNIT INVESTMENT TRUSTS
AND OTHER FIXED PORTFOLIO
INVESTMENT VEHICLES
THOMAS S. HARMAN*
Thomas Harman offers a comprehensive analysis of the Unit In-
vestment Trust. First, he defines the trust, examining the mechanics
and participants associated with it. He then traces the development of
the trust since its inception as a 'fixed trust. " Next he discusses the
regulation of the trust by the Securites Acts of 1933 and 1940. Finally,
he compares the unit investment trust with other investment vehicles.
The unit investment trust (UIT) has experienced many changes
since its inception some sixty years ago as a "fixed trust." Some of the
early fixed trusts were created as a result of the distrust of the excesses of
the managed investment companies revealed in the aftermath of the De-
pression. Others were created because of the diversification they pro-
vided and because they allowed small investors to obtain an interest in a
portfolio of securities that had become unaffordably expensive. Today
such trusts compete with mutual funds for many consumers' investment
dollars. In fact, by the end of 1986, UITs held assets worth approxi-
mately $110 billion, whereas mutual funds (other than money market
funds) held assets worth $424 billion.1 The growth in the UIT industry
has occurred rapidly. At the beginning of 1970, mutual funds had assets
of $52 billion, whereas UITs had assets of less than half a billion dollars.
By the beginning of 1975, mutual fund assets had declined to $38 billion
and UIT assets had grown to $4.4 billion. By the end of 1980, mutual
fund assets had risen to $138 billion and UIT assets had jumped to $41
* Chief, Office of Disclosure and Adviser Regulation, Division of Investment Management,
Securities and Exchange Commission. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Jeffrey
L. Steele, Adjunct Professor, Georgetown University Law Center, for reading and bommenting on
this article.
The Securities and Exchange Commission, as a matter of policy, disclaims responsibility for any
private publications by any of its employees. The views expressed herein are those of the author and
do not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission or the author's colleagues on the staff of the
Commission.
1. INVESTMENT CO. INST., 1987 MUTUAL FUND FACT BOOK: INDUSTRY TRENDS AND STA-
TISTICS FOR 1986, at 60; INVESTMENT CO. INST., REPORT ON TOTAL OUTSTANDING UNIT INVEST-
MENT TRUSTS FOR THE YEAR 1986 (1987).
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billion.2
A UIT is an unmanaged investment vehicle that invests in securities
and sells interests ("units") in itself. As such, it meets the definition of
"investment company" in section 3 of the Investment Company Act of
1940 (the 1940 Act).3 The 1940 Act specifically defines a UIT as an
investment company, organized under a trust indenture, that has no
board of directors and that "issues only redeemable securities, each of
which represents an undivided interest in a unit of specified securities."
'4
While the UIT, like a mutual fund, issues redeemable securities, it none-
theless is different from a mutual fund in that the entity sponsoring the
UIT nearly always creates a secondary market in the units sold by the
trust. Both the sponsor and the trust benefit from the creation of the
secondary market. The sponsor receives a sales charge on each unit re-
sold in the secondary market, often at a higher rate than that received on
units sold in the primary market. Unitholders enjoy a trust that does not
have to deplete itself of its assets-possibly under disadvantageous cir-
cumstances-to meet redemptions. Redemptions of portfolio securities
could cause premature termination of the trust if substantial enough or,
more likely, create distributions of principal to, remaining unitholders
that could be reinvested only less advantageously or upon payment of a
sales load or commission. 5
UITs are attractive investments because they offer liquidity and di-
versity at an affordable price. They allow investors of even moderate
means to own an interest in a pool of diversified securities and, because
they issue redeemable securities, they allow investors to liquidate their
investments quickly and avoid many of the market's vagaries. While a
mutual fund also offers diversification and liquidity, the UIT can provide
those attributes at a lower cost because it has no investment adviser to
whom it must pay an annual management fee. Moreover, because the
UIT has a relatively fixed portfolio, the brokerage commissions it incurs
are small in comparison to those of a mutual fund, the portfolio of which
often changes. Finally, because of its relatively fixed portfolio, the UIT
offers a "known" return. Conversely, a mutual fund's investment return
may rise or fall as it trades its portfolio or invests additional proceeds
from new shareholders.
2. WIESENBERGER INV. COS. SERV., INVESTMENT COMPANIES 1981, at 12, 563, 594, 598;
WIESENBERGER SERVS., INC., INVESTMENT COMPANIES 1975, at 49; WIESENBERGER SERVS., INC.,
INVESTMENT COMPANIES 1970, at 43.
3. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3 (1982).
4. Id. § 80a-4(2).
5. Unitholders liquidating their investment also used to benefit by receiving a slightly higher
price through the secondary market than through redemption. See infra notes 228-30 and accompa-
nying text.
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UITs now invest in a variety of securities. Many invest in municipal
bonds, but others invest in mortgage-backed securities. A third type of
UIT invests in corporate securities, particularly preferred stock and cor-
porate bonds. Although the vast majority of UITs invest in either mu-
nicipal or corporate bonds,6 some UITs even invest in equity securities.
In contrast, the early UITs essentially served as vehicles through which
one could invest in common stocks, particularly securities listed on the
New York Stock Exchange.7 The common stocks tended to represent a
cross section of various issuers, although a number of early UITs special-
ized in the equity securities of banks, railroads, insurance, public utility
or oil companies.8
Because UITs, unlike mutual funds, have no investment adviser or
board of directors, certain provisions of the 1940 Act clearly are irrele-
vant to them. Section 15, which governs the investment company's con-
tract with the adviser, and sections 10 and 16, which govern an
investment company's board of directors, are just a few examples. 9 Sec-
tion 18's extensive regulation of an investment company's capital struc-
ture is also irrelevant to UITs, because that provision applies only to
management investment companies. 10 Because a UIT is an essentially
static entity, the provision of the 1940 Act that governs an investment
company's transactions with its affiliates is also mostly irrelevant." This
static nature has even been recognized in the context of periodic report-
ing to the Securities and Exchange Commission (the Commission); while
mutual funds must file reports semi-annually with the Commission, UITs
need only file annually.1 2 Moreover, because the 1940 Act requires only
management investment companies to issue voting stock,13 the proxy
provision of the 1940 Act is also largely irrelevant. UITs are, however,
subject to certain important provisions under the 1940 Act.14
6. UITs investing in debt securities hold nearly $108 billion of the $110 billion in UITs. IN-
VESTMENT Co. INST., REPORT ON TOTAL OUTSTANDING UNIT INVESTMENT TRUSTS FOR THE
YEAR 1986 (1987).
7. Investment Trusts and Investment Companies: Hearings on S. 3580 Before a Subcomm. of
the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 184 (1940) [hereinafter Hearings
3580].
8. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMM'N, INVESTMENT TRuSTs AND INVESTMENT COMPA-
NIES: FIXED AND SEMIFIXED INVESTMENT TRUsTS 279 (1940) [hereinafter FIXED TRUST REPORT]
(pursuant to section 30 of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935); M. WILLIAMS, IN-
VESTMENT TRUSTS IN AMERICA 34 (1928). Some fixed trusts even "specialized" by investing in
bonds. FIXED TRUST REPORT, supra, at 279.
9. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-10, -15, -16 (1982).
10. Id. § 80a-18.
11. Id. § 80a-17.
12. 17 C.F.R. §§ 270.30a-1, .30b1-1 (1987).
13. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-18(i) (1982).
14. For a discussion of the relevant provisions, see infra notes 99-231 and accompanying text.
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This article describes the UIT in part I, offering insight into the
mechanics and participants associated with this investment vehicle. To
facilitate a better understanding of the UIT, part II analyzes the trust's
history, and part III discusses the key provisions of the Securities Act of
1933 (the 1933 Act)15 and the 1940 Act that apply to the UIT, with
particular emphasis on the registration and disclosure provisions. Fi-
nally, to sharpen the distinction between UITs and other fixed portfolio
investment vehicles, part IV compares UITs with other investment vehi-
cles that have some fixed portfolio attributes. 16
I. THE MECHANICS OF AND PARTICIPANTS ASSOCIATED WITH UNIT
INVESTMENT TRUSTS
The trust indenture, under which a UIT must be organized, governs
the administration of the trust and the activities of those associated with
it: the trustee, the depositor and the evaluator. The trust indenture also
provides for the termination of the trust and the distribution of its assets.
Many indentures stipulate that the trust will terminate after twenty
years, although some trusts have a shorter duration and others exist for
as many as fifty years. The 1940 Act, section 26 in particular, governs
certain aspects of the indenture and, in so doing, controls the identity
and activities of a UIT's trustee.1 7
The trust indenture typically does not govern the underwriting of
the trust. Instead, a separate agreement governs the distribution of the
trust. UIT underwritings generally are not conducted like the "best ef-
forts" underwriting of a mutual fund. Rather, each underwriter of a UIT
becomes the owner of a specific number of trust units on a certain date.
For so risking their capital and performing other activities, the under-
writers receive a concession out of the public offering price of the units.
The concession is often 3.5 to 3.7% of the public offering price, depend-
ing upon how many units the underwriter has agreed to purchase. The
public offering price includes the sales charge, which often ranges from 4
15. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-7Thbbb (1982).
16. Periodic payment plans and the separate accounts of insurance companies, both of which
are organized as, or in connection with, UITs, differ significantly from the traditional UIT and its
predecessor, and will not be analyzed.
17. For example, no principal underwriter for, or depositor of, a registered UIT may sell units
of the trust unless the trust indenture (1) designates a bank with capital of at least $500,000 as
trustee, (2) requires the trustee to have possession of all of the trust's assets, (3) prohibits the trustec
from resigning until a successor trustee has accepted trusteeship, and (4) requires the depositor to
mail a notice of substitution to unitholders within five days after the substitution of any security. 15
U.S.C. § 80a-26 (1982). The Trust Indenture Act of 1939, id. § 77aaa, does not govern a UIT's trust
indenture because of the exception found in section 304 of that act for two or more securities having
substantially different rights and privileges, id § 77ddd.
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to 6% of the public offering price. The underwriters may earn more than
just a concession. If a profit is made on the deposit of securities into the
UIT, all underwriters typically share in that profit. Any aggregate loss
on the acquisition of securities deposited in the UIT, however, is usually
borne solely by the sponsor.
The nature of a UIT underwriting has changed fundamentally since
the days of the fixed trusts. The fixed trusts studied by the Commission
in the 1930s, as discussed in more detail below, 18 continuously distrib-
uted their units. The depositor simply added portfolio securites to the
trust and created new units when the demand for them arose. In con-
trast, most UIT underwritings involve a single offering of fixed size. 19
In addition to the underwriters, the sponsor, the trustee and the
evaluator perform integral functions with respect to the UIT. The spon-
sor, of course, figures prominently in the life of the UIT. It organizes the
trust and generally bears all of the accompanying organizational ex-
penses. The sponsor is usually one of the underwriters of the trust. In
fact, sometimes all of the underwriters of a trust serve as sponsor or co-
sponsor. The sponsor earns money from the sales charge that constitutes
a portion of the sale price of the units, and from the spread between the
price at which it sells portfolio securities to the trust and the price it pays
for the portfolio securities-the difference between the "offering side"
and the "bid side." The sponsor may also receive compensation for pro-
viding portfolio supervisory services, because nothing requires only the
evaluator to provide those services. 20 The sponsor may even profit from
the use of cash paid to it before the date of settlement for the purchase of
units.
The UIT market is dominated by approximately two dozen sponsors
and co-sponsors, many of which are major securities firms. Some spon-
sors are retailers; they create UITs carrying their own name and sell
them to their own customers. Other sponsors are wholesalers; they cre-
ate trusts that do not carry their name and sell them primarily to retail-
ers for resale to the retailers' customers.
18. See infra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
19. Because the early UITs continuously distributed their shares, they, like mutual funds, had
an ongoing relationship with their underwriters. This prompted the Commission to propose that the
underwriting contract of a UIT be subject to the same restrictions the Commission drafted for the
underwriting contract of a mutual fund. Hearings 3580, supra note 7, at 11.
20. The staff of the Commission has agreed that the sponsor's provision of portfolio supervisory
services would not cause it to be an "investment adviser" of an investment company within the
meaning of section 2(a)(20) of the 1940 Act. Dean Witter Reynolds (pub. avail. May 6, 1983); see 15
U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(20) (1982). This position is not without significance; section 15(a) of the 1940 Act
governs, with specificity, certain aspects of an investment adviser's relationship with an investment
company. See id. § 80a-15(a).
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The trustee typically plays a ministerial role, with few if any trustee
functions; it is more of a custodian and administrator. The trustee, for
instance, collects and disburses the interest and dividends due on a trust's
portfolio securities. The trustee also provides unitholders with an annual
report disclosing such things as interest received, amounts actually dis-
tributed, and a list of the securities remaining in the trust as of a certain
date. The trustee's report to unitholders, typically provided for as a con-
dition of the trust indenture, is hardly superfluous; unlike mutual funds,
UITs are not required by the Commission to report to shareholders. 21
For its efforts, the trustee receives an annual fee based on the size of the
trust. In addition, the trustee profits from the use of monies it holds on
behalf of the UIT in noninterest-bearing accounts for future distributions
of interest or principal. Three or four major banks serve as trustee to
most UITs, but some UITs employ a subsidiary of their sponsor as
trustee.2
2
The evaluator of a UIT performs at least one vital trust function.
For either a fixed annual fee or a fixed fee per evaluation, the evaluator
values the trust's portfolio for purposes of redemption and the secondary
market. The evaluator also may perform portfolio supervisory services
for the UIT; that is, for the purpose of meeting redemptions, the evalu-
ator may designate the portfolio securities to be sold after consideration
of a variety of factors such as interest rates, marketability, and market
value. The evalutor's fee for these supervisory services is often based on
the size of the UIT. Nothing in the 1940 Act requires the evaluator to be
independent from the sponsor and, indeed, the sponsor or one of its affili-
ates often serves as evaluator. The evaluator, like the trustee, is paid by
the UIT, not by the sponsor.
II. THE BACKGROUND OF THE UNIT INVESTMENT TRUST
Unlike the managed investment company, the UIT originated in the
United States-not in Great Britain.23 One of the earliest trusts arose in
1924 as the result of a businessman's desire to increase the public owner-
ship in his company. Because his company's stock was selling at $400
per share, the businessman deposited one share of his company with his
bank, requested that the bank act as custodian, and obtained ten bankers'
21. Commission rules require only those UITs that invest substantially all of their shares in one
management investment company to provide their shareholders with a report. 17 C.F.R. § 270.30d-
2 (1987).
22. The Kemper Tax-Exempt Insured Income Trust, for instance, uses Investors Fiduciary
Trust Company (Investors) as its trustee. Investors is jointly owned by Kemper Financial Services,
Inc. and DST Systems, Inc.
23. The first British UIT appeared in 1931. F. LEWCOCK, THE FIXED TRUST YEARBOOK
1936, at 2 (1937).
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receipts. He then sold the ten receipts of pro rata participating inter-
ests.24 The popularity of these trusts, known as "fixed" or "semi-fixed"
trusts, grew rapidly, and by 1930 fixed trusts had total assets of nearly
$300 million.25 By the end of 193 1, approximately 100 million fixed trust
shares had been sold in the United States and more than 150 trusts had
been organized. 26
The meteoric rise in fixed trusts, however, was not primarily attribu-
table to the desire of businessmen to increase the public ownership of
their companies. Rather, the rapid growth resulted from the public's de-
mand for common stock, the predominant investment of the fixed trusts,
and from the public's distrust of managed investment companies that
grew from the misbehavior of the management of those companies dur-
ing the 1929 crash.27 Fixed trusts capitalized on the public's distrust of
management by emphasizing the trusts' "fixed" nature: investors got
what they saw and could rest assured that no management would alter or
tinker with their investments.
Newspaper, magazine, mail and radio advertising substantially con-
tributed to the large volume of fixed trust shares sold from 1929 to
1931.28 The affordability of fixed trusts, which generally required a mini-
mum purchase of only five shares--each share usually selling in the
range of eight to ten dollars-also probably contributed to their early
popularity. 29
Unlike the managed investment companies, which were largely cre-
ated by investment bankers and broker-dealers, fixed trusts typically
were created by individual promoters.30 Yet, like the managed invest-
ment companies, fixed trusts relied on investment bankers and broker-
dealers to distribute their shares. By 1931, the great majority of invest-
ment bankers were selling fixed trust shares, and dealer syndicates were
regularly organizing to sell such shares.3' Two factors primarily at-
tracted dealers to the distribution of fixed trust shares. First, fixed trust
sponsors increased the commission on fixed trust shares to six percent of
24. W. DURST, ANALYSIS AND HANDBOOK OF INVESTMENT TRUSTS 265 (1932).
25. FIXED TRUST REPORT, supra note 8, at 239.
26. W. DuRsT, supra note 24, at 265-66.
27. FIXED TRUST REPORT, supra note 8, at 15; 4 T. FRANKEL, THE REGULATION OF MONEY
MANAGERS, ch. 29, § A.1, at 162 (1980).
28. FIXED TRUST REPORT, supra note 8, at 151. These fixed trusts were advertised in such
magazines as Atlantic Monthly, Harper's, Scribner's Magazine and The American Mercury. Id. at
151 n.27.
29. FIXED TRUST REPORT, supra note 8, at 11.
30. Id.
31. L. CHAMBERLAIN & W. HAY, INVESTMENT AND SPECULATION 162-63 (1931). A national
survey in 1931 revealed that 86% of the investment bankers reached by the surveyors were then
selling fixed trust shares. Id at 163.
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the selling price, much more than the commission on bonds that most
small dealers sold.32 Second, fixed trust shares were sold without any
commitment from either primary distributors or dealers.33 Because no
firm commitment was required, dealers were able to distribute fixed trust
shares without tying up capital.
The popularity of UITs declined after the 1930s. 34 Few if any UITs
were actively selling their shares by the outbreak of World War II, and
less than 100 trusts existed by the end of the war.35 UITs increased in
number in the 1950s, but their raison d'&re had completely changed.
They mostly served as funding vehicles for purchasing interests in either
the stock of a single industrial corporation or a specified mutual fund. 36
Because they issued "periodic payment plan certificates," these UITs
were merely a mechanism for buying something else on an installment
basis. The forty installment plans that did invest in fixed trust shares
during the 1930s 37 declined in importance, and by 1964 over seventy-five
percent of the $2.9 million of active UIT assets were invested in invest-
ment companies other than UITs, most of which were mutual funds. 38
UITs resembling the old fixed trusts began to reappear in 1961 as an
investment vehicle for municipal bonds. Until the tax laws changed in
1976 to allow mutual funds to pass through income from municipal
bonds on a tax-free basis, UITs offered investors the only tax-exempt way
of obtaining a diversified portfolio of municipal bonds. 39 As UITs in-
creased in number and size, their colmection with municipal bonds con-
tinued. By the end of 1986, over ninety percent of the 7900 UIT series
invested predominantly in municipal securities. Of the more than $110
billion invested in UITs, more than $91 billion were in municipal trusts
32. FIXED TRUST REPORT, supra note 8, at 17. -
33. Id. at 17, 146; L. CHAMBERLAIN & W. HAY, supra note 31, at 163.
34. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMM'N, PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF INVESTMENT
COMPANY GROWTH, H.R. REP. No. 2337, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 38 (1966) [hereinafter PUBLIC POL-
ICY IMPLICATIONS].
35. 7 SEC ANN. REP. 8 (1941); 13 SEC ANN. REP. 110-11 (1947). For a list of the 56 UITs
registered with the Commission as of November 12, 1940, see Investment Company Act Release No.
13 (Nov. 19, 1940).
36. Both UITs that registered in 1954 were organized for the purpose of operating periodic
payment plans for the purchase of mutual funds. 20 SEC ANN. REP. 94 (1954). Both UITs that
registered in 1955 did so to invest in the stock of a single industrial corporation. 21 SEC ANN. REP.
97 (1955).
37. FIXED TRUST REPORT, supra note 8, at 160; see also W. DuRsT, supra note 24, at 296-99.
38. 30 SEC ANN. REP. 111 (1964). In 1964, 107 active UITs existed; 54 were periodic-payment
UITs, with $2.4 billion in assets, while the remaining 53 had $450 million in assets. Id.
39. 4 T. FRANKEL, supra note 27, ch. 16, § 16, at 314. The passage of the Tax Reform Act of
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 229, made clear that the pass-through tax exemption treatment of
investment companies organized as trusts and investing in tax-exempt securities also extended to
investment companies organized as corporations.
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alone/ ° While the modem UITs that invested in municipal bonds ini-
tially resurfaced in 1961, the first corporate bond and preferred stock
UITs did not appear until 1972, and the first government securities UITs
were not offered until 1978.41
A. The Early Fixed Trusts.
Like their modem counterparts, the early fixed trsts were concep-
tually simple. An organizer acquired a diversified portfolio of securities,
deposited them with a trustee, and issued a certain number of participat-
ing units or trust certificates against the deposited securities. The price
of the units sold was based on the current market value of the unit, and
the securities placed in the trust were selected either by the organizer
itself or by one of the various professional statistical organizations. 42
While the early trusts were set up with termination dates ranging from
two to ninety-nine years, most trusts terminated twenty years from in-
ception.43 At maturity, the securities of the trust were liquidated and the
proceeds, along with any other trust assets, were proportionately distrib-
uted to shareholders.
The early fixed trusts varied from each other in several key respects.
Trusts known as "distributive" trusts sold all stock dividends and rights
received from their portfolio securities and disbursed the proceeds to
unitholders. Other trusts retained those rights in their portfolios; they
were known as "accumulative" trusts. The popularity of these two types
of trusts varied with one's view of the stock market and the economy;
accumulative trusts were popular in "bear" markets whereas distributive
trusts were popular in "bull" markets.44 Some trusts featured reserve
funds, in which a certain amount of trust income was retained each year,
while other trusts distributed all income received.45 The reserve fund of
a trust allowed it to take up stock subscription rights in its portfolio se-
curities, to add more shares of certain portfolio companies to the trust, or
to maintain a certain fixed dividend rate. Over time, the reserve fund
tended to build up the rate of income of the trust, through the reinvest-
ment of such reserves in interest-bearing assets.46 During periods of
prosperity, however, the reserve proved disadvantageous because the
yield on its reinvestments could be less than the appreciation on
40. INVESTMENT CO. INST., supra note 6.
41. WIESENBERGER INV. COS. SERV., INVESTMENT COMPANIES 1980, at 577, 580 (1980).
42. M. WILLIAMS, supra note 8, at 34, 70.
43. W. DuRST, supra note 24, at 269.
44. Id. at 272.
45. M. WILLIAMS, supra note 8, at 72. Some organizers created the reserve fund by depositing
cash along with stock at the inception of the trust. Id
46. Id at 34-35.
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securities.47
B. The Depositor.
The depositor performed a number of functions and enjoyed a vari-
ety of powers with respect to the fixed trusts. It deposited the underlying
securities into the trust, specified the time of sale of portfolio securities,
reinvested trust monies, voted the portfolio securities, terminated or ex-
tended the trust under certain conditions, and appointed a successor
trustee in the event of removal, resignation, or incapacity. 48 The deposi-
tor had the power to assign all of its rights to another company with the
trustee's approval, to call a meeting of shareholders to ascertain their
views, and to amend the trust agreement-without shareholder con-
sent-with respect to minor changes. 49
The depositor received compensation from a variety of sources. In
fact, some depositors earned more from the "hidden charges" associated
with fixed trusts than from the publicized sales load.50 The "hidden
charges" came from a number of sources. Several of the "hidden
charges" were counected to the depositor's sale of portfolio securities to
the trust. The depositor bought securities for the trust on the bid side,
but sold them to the trust at the offering side. Furthermore, the deposi-
tor added a brokerage commission to the price of securities sold to the
trust, and, with few exceptions, charged the trust odd-lot brokerage pre-
miums--even though the depositor purchased the portfolio securities in
round lots. The depositor retained the difference. 51 The depositor also
adjusted the cost of the portfolio shares by rounding them to a higher
fraction of a dollar.52
Other "hidden charges" were connected to the sales load. The de-
positor not only earned the difference between the bid and the asked
price on the portfolio securities it sold to the trust; it typically charged a
sales load on the same differential and on the differential between the
odd-lot and the round-lot brokerage commission as well.5 3 It also
charged a sales load on accumulations, which were sums such as cash
47. Id. at 51; W. DuRsT, supra note 24, at 286. The reserve fund feature lost popularity and
was discontinued as a result of rising markets.
48. FIXED TRUST REPORT, supra note 8, at 39-40.
49. Id. With the consent of the trustee and a majority of the shareholders, the depositor could
amend the trust with respect to things other than basic aspects of the trust. Id.
50. Id. at 165.
51. Id. at 149, 166; L. CHAMBERLAIN & W. HAY, supra note 31, at 137-40.
52. FIXED TRUST REPORT, supra note 8, at 167-68.
53. Id. at 167. The Commission issued a stop order suspending the effectiveness of a registra-
tion statement of a fixed trust, because the trust failed to disclose, among other things, the sales load
on the bid-offering differential. In re T.I.S. Management Corp., 3 S.E.C. 174 (1938).
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dividends that had accrued on the portfolio securities since the previous
distribution date, which were added to the offering price and paid by the
investor as equalization payments (the pro rata amount of the accumula-
tion that had accrued since the previous distribution date). Because
these accumulations were disbursed to the investor at the next distribu-
tion, charging a sales load on accumulations amounted to charging the
investor for the advance of his money.54 The depositor also failed to
reduce the sales load as the termination date of a trust approached, and
'since part of the sales load typically compensated the trustee for its serv-
ices rendered during the entire existence of the trust, the depositor made
a greater profit on secondary market sales as a trust neared termination
because of the fees it would not have to pay the trustee.5 5 When a trust
prematurely terminated, the depositor also retained sales loads, which
again compensated the trustee.56
The depositor made money on the trust through more than just the
workings of the sales load and the deposit of the portfolio securities. The
depositor also often paid itself the interest earned on any funds of the
trust and sometimes paid itself a management fee from trust assets.57 As
with portfolio securities, the depositor often rounded up to a higher frac-
tion the offering price of the trust's shares.5 8 When the trustee sold trust
property such as stock dividends to make distributions, it sometimes sold
the property to the depositor at less than the best price obtainable, al-
lowing the depositor to resell it for an immediate profit.5 9 Additionally,
when investors sought to liquidate their investments by converting their
trust units into the underlying property owned by the trust, the depositor
often charged a conversion fee.60 With other investors seeking to liqui-
date, the depositor might drop its bid price below the liquidating value
and then liquidate the shares at a profit.61
No discussion of depositor compensation would be complete with-
out some mention of exchange fees. Trust sponsors often made a series
of offers to exchange old trust shares for shares of newly created fixed
54. FixED TRUsT REPORT, supra note 8, at 166-67.
55. Id. at 173-74.
56. Id. at 174.
57. Id. at 172-73. Some trusts charged the unitholders 10% of current income on an annual
basis. L. CHAMBERLAIN & W. HAY, supra note 31, at 139. The fact that some depositors charged
their trust a management fee may explain why the definition of a UIT, found in section 4(2), 15
U.S.C. § 77(d)(5) (1982), does not define a UIT as an investment company without an investment
adviser.
58. FIXED TRUST REPORT, supra note 8, at 167-68.
59. Id. at 175-77.
60. Id. at 180, 193.
61. Id. at 177.
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trusts and, subsequently, for shares of mutual funds.62 These exchanges
were accompanied by additional sales loads. Pressured by the threat of
their trust being terminated, by warnings of the loss of money if an ex-
change were not made, and by promises of benefit if an exchange were
made, investors were often persuaded to switch from one trust to an-
other.63 Because an investor's assets were so depleted by the successive
sales loads that accompanied each exchange, however, a depositor usu-
ally could induce only two exchanges. 64 Campaigns to induce exchanges
often began shortly after shares of the fixed trust were sold.65 Exchanges
were so important that when depositors sold control of their businesses
to someone else, the price depended on the purchasers' success in per-
suading investors to exchange out of their trust units. 66 Adding insult to
injury, investors were not infrequently led to believe that depositors
made exchanges without profit.67
Many depositors' lack of stability created liquidity problems for
trust investors. Depositors often lacked significant assets, and they fre-
quently assigned interests in their businesses to others. Repeated trans-
fers were not unusual and were typically accompalied by diminution and
depletion of the depositors' assets. The depositors were generally organ-
ized as corporations; at some point, the repeated transfers of interest
transformed the corporations into mere shells.68 This often resulted in
no one standing ready to repurchase investors' fixed trust shares.69 "Or-
phan trusts," a problem specifically addressed by the 1940 Act, thus
arose.
C. The Trustee.
While the trustee of a fixed trust generally had rather limited duties,
it nonetheless filled two vital roles. It performed a variety of mostly ad-
ministrative tasks and, of equal importance, lent its prestige and name to
the fixed trust enterprise. Advertisements for fixed trusts stressed, per-
haps more than anything else, that the portfolio of a trust was placed in
the custody of a trustee and that investors thus were completely pro-
tected.70 In fact, one reason for the relatively few fixed trust sponsors
was that it became difficult for new trust sponsors to find leading banks
62. Id. at 209.
63. Id. at 230, 209.
64. Id. at 209.
65. Id. at 230.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 211.
68. Id. at 39, 47, 206.
69. Id. at 39, 206.
70. Id. at 73.
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to act as trustees.71
In addition to holding legal title to a trust's portfolio, the trustee
administered the trust. It created the trust units upon the deposit of the
portfolio securities by the depositor, received all income and distributions
on the portfolio securities, credited interest and other payments to trust
shareholders, and sold portfolio securities, including those received
through stock dividends, upon the depositor's direction. The trustee also
voted the shares of the portfolio companies as directed by the deposi-
tor,72 delivered proxies to the depositor, and kept the books and records,
maintaining them for inspection. 73 A key power not delegated to the
trustee was that of making substitutions to the trust.74 Some trustees,
however, were given authority to eliminate portfolio securities from a
trust.75
D. Financing and Distribution of the Fixed Trust.
Another aspect of the fixed trust in which banks played an integral
role lay in the financing of the trust. Banks often financed depositors'
purchase of portfolio securities, especially when they had agreed to serve
as trustee of a particular trust. The bank would extend credit to the
depositor by advancing it sufficient funds to pay for the portfolio securi-
ties delivered to the bank by the brokers selling the portfolio securities.
The bank then took the securities as trustee and issued trust certificates
against the deposit. The bank thus possessed either the portfolio securi-
ties or the trust certificates at all times. When the depositor received a
draft from a dealer to pay for trust shares, it then immediately dis-
counted the draft with the bank so that it could free up its capital.76
The bank also served as the fulcrum in the distribution chain of
fixed trust securities. Investors typically ordered fixed trust shares from
retail dealers who placed orders with wholesale distributors. The orders
then generally went to the depositor, who directed a broker to purchase
the securities necessary to create a unit and then deposited the portfolio
71. Id. at 34-35.
72. In 1931, the New York Stock Exchange began requiring trusts that sought to remain on the
Exchange's "unobjectionable" list to provide for voting by trust shareholders whose ownership in a
fixed trust was sufficiently large to be equivalent to whole shares in the trust's portfolio. Despite this
requirement, trust shareholders apparently never exercised this right. Id. at 100-01; see also W.
DuRsT, supra note 24, at 283 (describing voting arrangements).
73. FIXED TRUST REPORT, supra note 8, at 73-74.
74. See id. at 125-26 (classifying fixed trusts by type of elimination and substitution provisions);
cf id. at 88-89 (recounting testimony of trust company officer about lack of substitution and elmina-
tion powers).
75. Id. at 125.
76. Id. at 150.
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securities with the trustee. The trustee issued trust certificates and deliv-
ered them to the depositor, the investor received his shares after they had
gone through the wholesale distributor and the retail dealer.77 It is im-
portant to note that the distribution of fixed trust shares involved a con-
tinuous offering; as more orders were received, new units of the trust
were created. Unlike a conventional offering, in which the promoter or
sponsor could not alter the amount of stock issued after execution of the
underwriting agreement, a fixed trust sponsor "could regulate, at will,
the quantity of shares issued depending upon the public response. 78
UITs typically also involved a continuous offering, but generally for a
different reason-the maintenance of a secondary market in the trust
shares.
E. Liquidity of Trust Shares.
While few of the earliest fixed trust shares sold ever returned to the
market,79 fixed trust purchasers nonetheless had several alternatives
available when liquidating their investments. Some trusts redeemed their
shares, either in cash or in kind, and because fixed trusts consisted of
units of specified securities, the fixed trust investor was generally able to
obtain his proportionate share of portfolio securities from the trustee at
any time.80 Of course, investors paid for the right to convert, and in
most cases a large portion of the conversion charge was pure profit to the
trust sponsor."' Many trust sponsors did maintain a secondary market
for shares issued by their trusts, 2 although their volume of activity was
not large.
Fixed trust investors could liquidate their shares through markets
other than those maintained by trust sponsors. Some fixed trust shares
traded on stock exchanges, particularly the smaller stock exchanges,8 3
and it was not always necessary to list a fixed trust on a given exchange
to trade it on that exchange.8 4 The listing of fixed trust shares that did
occur discontinued in 1935 and was accompanied by the delisting of
most trusts then listed. At least one industry representative attributed
77. Id. at 148-49.
78. Id. at 146; see also id. at 10; M. WILLIAMS, supra note 8, at 23-24 (Both fixed trusts and
open-end management trusts differ fiom ordinary corporate issuers in the practice of continuously
offering their shares.).
79. L. CHAMBERLAIN & W. HAY, supra note 31, at 143.
80. FIXED TRUST REPORT, supra note 8, at 9.
81. Id. at 193.
82. W. DURsT, supra note 24, at 269, 291.
83. Id. at 269.
84. FIXED TRusT REPORT, supra note 8, at 201. Fixed trusts' shares traded, among other
places, on the Chicago Board of Trade, the Chicago Curb Exchange, and the New York Produce
Exchange.
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this to the detailed requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.85 In addition to the exchanges, investors could often sell their fixed
trust shares in the over-the-counter market.86
F. Elimination and Substitution of Portfolio Securities.
The "fixed" nature of fixed trusts evolved over time. While fixed
trusts became popular in response to the public's dissatisfaction with
managed trusts, their very rigidity necessitated further refinements. As
market conditions changed, rigidly fixed trusts were unable to respond to
significant market movements because of their "frozen" portfolios. Trust
sponsors attempted to resolve the problem of rigidity by creating new
trusts with some power to eliminate or substitute portfolio securities and
by persuading trust shareholders to switch, for a sales charge of course,
into the newer trusts.8 7
Fixed trusts were created with at least four types of elimination or
substitution authority. Some trusts allowed the elimination of securities,
but only in instances of merger, consolidation, reorganization, or the sale
of all of the portfolio company's property. Other trusts allowed eimina-
tion on the basis of some mechanical test such as a portfolio company's
passage of a dividend for several periods. A third type allowed the elimi-
nation of portfolio securities generally, within the discretion of the depos-
itor, the trustee, or both, and a fourth type allowed substitutions by the
depositor as well as eliminations. 88
The elimination provisions of fixed trusts often became rather com-
plex. A portfolio company could be eliminated: (1) if its rating was dis-
continued or fell below a certain level; (2) if it reported average net
earnings lower than the net earnings over the immediately preceding
three years; (3) if its price ever exceeded its "intrinsic" worth; (4) if the
depositor opined that the portfolio company's capital and surplus were
endangered; (5) if the trust shareholders voted to eliminate it; or (6) if its
value exceeded some value specified in the trust agreement.8 9
Those engaged in the selling of fixed trusts frequently emphasized
the elimination provisions. Fixed trust sponsors emphasized the impor-
tance of the elimination provisions and of the superior nature of their
provisions as compared to others.90 The New York Stock Exchange re-
quired members seeking to organize or affiliate with a fixed trust to dis-
85. Id. at 202.
86. Id. at 203-06.
87. Id. at 128; W. DuRsT, supra note 24, at 291.
88. FIXED TRUST REPORT, supra note 8, at 125, 129; M. WILLIAMS, supra note 8, at 71.
89. Id. at 126 n.8.
90. Id. at 126.
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close their elimination and substitution provisions in their advertisements
if their advertisements included any information usually contained in the
trust's offering circular. 91
Despite their evolution and the importance placed upon them by the
trust sponsors who created them, elimination provisions proved a mixed
blessing. They actually created many of the large losses sustained by
fixed trusts.92 In particular, the provision requiring elimination of port-
folio companies that had passed a dividend was singled out as forcing
elimination at the worst time.93
G. Fixed Trust Advertising.
Fixed trust advertising was often incomplete or misleading. Many
trust sponsors improperly characterized what their trusts were distribut-
ing; thus many trust purchasers did not realize how substantial a part of
the returns that they received labeled as "dividends" was merely repay-
ment of the capital they had contributed to the trust.94 This problem was
especially acute with the first distribution of a trust, when some trust
sponsors backdated trust agreements to make it appear that the first dis-
tribution represented earnings, not a return of capital.95 Trust sponsors
also failed clearly to distinguish stock dividends from cash dividends in
their advertising. The more meticulous fixed trusts, however, did distin-
guish between their cash dividends and the cash distributed from the sale
of stock dividends. 96
Hypothetical performance advertisements also deceived investors.
Trust sponsors often advertised what their trust would have earned had
it been created up to twenty years earlier. This hypothetical performance
included the cash and stock dividends, stock rights, and split-ups that the
trust would have received during the relevant period, even though some
of the underlying securities would have been eliminated by the trust's
elimination provisions.97 In 1931, the New York Stock Exchange pro-
hibited its members from including hypothetical performance in fixed
trust offering circulars and required trusts that showed performance in
their offering circulars to do so for each year of the trust since
inception.98
91. W. DURST, supra note 24, at 419.
92. FIXED TRUST REPORT, supra note 8, at 143-44.
93. Hearings 3580, supra note 7, at 186 (statement of David Schenker, Chief Counsel, SEC
Investment Trust Study).
94. L. CHAMBERLAIN & W. HAY, supra note 31, at 155.
95. FixED TRUST REPORT, supra note 8, at 155.
96. L. CHAMBERLAIN & W. HAY, supra note 31, at 158.
97. FixED TRUST REPORT, supra note 8, at 153-54.
98. W. DURST, supra note 24, at 418.
1060 [Vol. 1987:1045
UNIT INVESTMENT TRUSTS
III. UNIT INVESTMENT TRUSTS UNDER THE 1933 AND 1940 ACTS
Many of the 1940 Act's provisions are irrelevant to fixed portfolio
investment companies such as UITs. Several provisions, however, are
particularly relevant to UITs. Unfortunately, as with many statutes, the
legislative-and administrative-history is sometimes frustratingly
vague. The key UIT provisions under the 1933 Act, fortunately, are
more straightforward and circumscribed.
A. Registration and Disclosure Under the Securities Laws.
UITs, like other investment companies, receive special registration
and disclosure treatment under the securities laws. Mutual funds and
UITs, for instance, may register an indefinite number of shares under
their registration statements and then pay for the net shares sold (shares
sold less shares redeemed) at the end of the year. Such registration treat-
ment is not accorded non-investment-company issuers under the securi-
ties laws. Before this section examines the registration and disclosure
provisions of the 1933 and 1940 Acts that specifically affect UITs, how-
ever, some background is needed.
A UIT is generally comprised of many series. Each series issued by
the trust has a different portfolio, and a purchaser of units looks ouly to
that series for his investment return. Although two series within a trust
might be identical except for the fact that their portfolios contain differ-
ent securities, there is no requirement that series within a trust be identi-
cal or even similar; indeed, they often are not. Each series is considered a
separate offering under the 1933 Act and must file a separate registration
statement that becomes effective under section 8(a) of that act. 99 Only
the trust itself, however-and not each series-need register under the
1940 Act. (In contrast, a single mutual fund may also consist of a
number of series that must each be registered under the 1933 Act, but
each such series need not be registered pursuant to a separate registration
statement under the 1933 Act.) The relatively large growth in the
number of UITs and their series, even in comparison to the rapid growth
in the size of the mutual fund industry, has led the Commission to revise
substantially the UIT registration process.
1. 1933 Act Registration Provisions. In 1982, the Commission
adopted rule 487,100 granting UITs registration relief not previously
99. 15 U.S.C. § 77h(a) (1982).
100. 17 C.F.R. § 230.487 (1987); see Automatic Effectiveness of Registration Statements Filed
by Certain Investment Trusts, Securities Act Release No. 6401, [1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) % 83,210, at 85,059 (May 7, 1982) (announcing adoption of rule 487) [hereinafter Re-
lease 6401].
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granted to any other issuer. The rule, which was originally proposed as
rule 475b,101 permits a particular type of 1933 Act registration statement
to become effective automatically, without affirmative action by the
Commission staff. It also permits a registrant to designate the date and
time of the registration statement's effectiveness. In proposing the rule,
the Commission noted that rule 485102 permitted posteffective amend-
ments to 1933 Act registration statements filed by mutual funds and
UITs to become effective automatically, without affirmative action by the
Commission. 10 3 It further noted that, under rule 485(b), certain post-
effective amendments, including the annual updating amendments filed
to make the financial statements in a registrant's prospectus current pur-
suant to section 10(a)(3) of the 1933 Act,1°4 may become effective imme-
diately upon filing or on a date chosen by the registrant within twenty
days after filing.105 While initial registration statements for UIT series
could not become effective under a rule governing posteffective amend-
ments (section 8(a) of the 1933 Act governs the effectiveness of initial
registration statements 10 6 and section 8(c) governs posteffective amend-
ments107), the Commission stated its belief that it was appropriate to
treat registration statements for subsequent series of a UIT like post-
effective amendments because, like annual updating amendments, regis-
tration statements for series of a UIT may vary only with respect to the
financial information provided about each series.108
To be able to use rule 487, a registrant must identify a previous
series of the trust for which the Commission or its staff has determined
the effective date of the registration statement. The registrant also must
represent that the securities deposited in the series being registered do
not differ materially in type or quality from those deposited in the previ-
ous series, and that the registration statement for the new series contains
no disclosures that differ in any material respect from those of the previ-
ous series, except to the extent necessary to identify the specific portfolio
securities deposited in, and to provide essential financial information for,
the new series. Finally, the registrant must represent that it has complied
with rule 460109 under the 1933 Act relating to the circulation of a pre-
101. Automatic Effectiveness of Registration Statements Filed Under the Securities Act of 1933
by Certain Unit Investment Trusts, Securities Act Release No. 6356, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder]
Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,041, at 84,585-86 (Oct. 21, 1981) [hereinafter Release 6356].
102. 17 C.F.R. § 230.485 (1987).
103. Release 6356, supra note 101, at 84,583.
104. 15 U.S.C. § 77j(a)(3) (1982).
105. Release 6356, supra note 101, at 84,584.
106. 15 U.S.C. § 77h(a) (1982).
107. Id. § 77h(c).
108. Release 6356, supra note 101, at 84,584.
109. 17 C.F.R. § 230.460 (1987).
1062 [V:ol. 1987:1045
UNIT INVESTMENT TRUSTS
liminary prospectus.
In 1985, in conjunction with the proposal of Form N-7 as the inte-
grated registration form for UITs, the Commission proposed to revise
rule 487 so that no UIT series could use the rule unless the previous
series being relied upon had been declared effective by the Commission or
its staff within the previous two years. 110 The Commission explained
that, as a result of the significantly different proposed registration form, it
wanted to review UIT initial registration statements more closely. When
it reproposed Form N-7, the Commission outlined possible further
changes to rule 487, intended to simplify filings.'
With the adoption of rule 487, the Commission established a mech-
anism that enables many UIT issuers to go to market whenever they
choose, unconstrained by Commission review. Thus, UIT issuers be-
came the first issuers to gain the sort of control over the registration
process that some corporate issuers would later gain when rule 415112.
the "shelf-registration" rule-was adopted.
2. 1940 Act Registration Provisions. The provisions of the 1940
Act that deal with the registration of investment company securities
under the 1933 Act have evolved over several decades to simplify the
registration process for investment companies. Section 24 of the 1940
Act '1 3 has been amended twice: first, to permit investment companies to
amend their registration statements to increase the number of shares reg-
istered under the 1933 Act, and, second, to provide for the retroactive
registration of investment company securities and the indefinite registra-
tion of investment company securities.
The first of these amendments occurred in 1954 when subsection (e)
was added to section 24. Congress recognized that certain investment
companies engaged in continuous offerings-unit investment trusts, face-
amount certificate companies, and mutual funds-and that such compa-
nies filed new registration statements under the 1933 Act each year to
ensure the availability of registered shares. 1 4 Noting that section 6 of
110. Securities Act Release No. 6580, [1984-1985 Transfer Binder) Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1
83,774, at 87,453 (May 14, 1985) [hereinafter Release 6580].
111. Form N-7 for Registration of Unit Investment Trusts under the Securities Act of 1933 and
the Invesment Company Act of 1940, Securities Act Release No. 6693, [1987 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 84,109, at 88,562-63 (Mar. 9, 1987) [hereinafter Release 6693).
112. 17 C.F.R. § 230.415 (1987).
113. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-24 (1982).
114. H.R. REP. No. 1542, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 16, 30, reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMiN. NEWS 2973, 2989, 3003. The legislative history gave no clue as to why UITs were then
considered engaged in continuous offerings, that is, whether they were constantly creating new units
like the old fixed trusts or were merely engaged in secondary market activities.
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the 1933 Act" 5 provides for the registration of securities through a regis-
tration statement but does not provide for registering additional securi-
ties through an amendment to the registration statement, Congress
added subsection (e) to pernit those investment companies to increase
the number of shares registered under the 1933 Act by amending their
existing registration statement. While the legislative history of this sub-
section contemplated that an investment company could amend its regis-
tration statement at intervals of approximately one year,116 the language
of section 24(e) permits an investment company to amend its registration
statement anytime after the effective date of the registration statement.
More than twenty years later, in 1977, the Commission proposed
and adopted rule 24e-2," 7 making the use of section 24(e) significantly
less expensive and thus more attractive. By permitting investment com-
panies registering additional securities under that subsection to adjust
their registration fees for the securities previously repurchased or re-
deemed, the Commission recognized that an issuer (and its shareholders)
that continuously repurchases or redeems and then resells its shares
could pay "inordinately" high registration fees and thus be unfairly bur-
dened by the registration process." 8 Yet, as proposed, rule 24e-2 offered
no relief to UITs.1 9 Several commentators asserted that UITs should be
able to utilize the rule, and the Commission agreed, noting that the regis-
tration relief of section 24(e) itself extended to UITs as well as mutual
funds.' 20 The Commission thus adopted the rule on a basis that made it
115. 15 U.S.C. § 77f (1982). S'ection 6(b) of the 1933 Act requires a registrant, at the time it files
a registration statement, to pay the Commission a fee of one-fiftieth of one per centum of the maxi-
mum aggregate price at which such shares are proposed to be offered. Id. § 77f(b).
116. H.R. REP. No. 1542, supra note 114, at 30, reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS at 3003.
117. 17 C.F.R. § 270.24e-2 (1987).
118. Computation of Filing Fee for Securities Registered by Open-End Management Companies,
Investment Company Act Release No. 9677, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) %
81,010, at 87,670 (Mar. 15, 1977) (proposing rule 24e-2) [hereinafter Release 9677]. "Inordinately
high" fees could result because such fees were based on the total amount of securities being regis-
tered regardless of whether the securities replaced securities that had been repurchased or redeemed.
The Commission reached this conclusion because of its consistent position that, "absent an available
exemption, all securities offered or sold by an issuer are subject to the registration requirements of
the 1933 Act, notwithstanding the fact that such securities may have been redeemed or repurchased
by the issuer subsequent to their earlier sale by the issuer pursuant to a registration statement." Id.
The Commission reiterated this position when it adopted rule 24e-2 and reproposed Form N-7.
Computation of Filing Fee for Securilies Registered by Open-End Investment Companies and Unit
Investment Trusts, Investment Company Act Release No. 9819, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 81,210, at 88,213 (June 16, 1977) [hereinafter Release 9819]; Release 6693,
supra note 111, at 88,554 n.2.
119. As proposed, rule 24e-2 gave registration-fee relief only to open-end management invest-
ment companies.
120. Release 9819, supra note 118, at 88,213.
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available to UITs.
Interestingly, one year earlier the Commission had proposed and
adopted another type of registration relief for various types of investment
companies, including UITs. Rule 24f-2 implemented section 24(f) of the
1940 Act,121 which was added to the 1940 Act by the Investment Com-
pany Amendments Act of 1970.122 That section authorized the Commis-
sion to adopt rules allowing certain types of investment companies to
register an indefinite number of securities. Section 24(f) and rule 24f-2
thus accommodate the unique character of investment companies issuing
redeemable securities that, with the exception of "certaiu unit investment
trusts"' 123 continually offer their shares for sale and thus have difficulty
prospectively determining how many securities to register. Rule 24f-2
permits an eligible investment company to elect to register an indefinite
number of securities and then to complete its registration process by fil-
ing an annual notice setting forth the number of shares sold, accompa-
nied by the fee owed on such securities. Like rule 24e-2, rule 24f-2
contains a provision allowing registrants to pay 1933 Act registration
fees only on net securities sold during the last fiscal year. 124
In addition to permitting UITs to amend their registration state-
ments to register additional securities, to pay for such securities on a
"net" basis, and to register shares on an indefinite basis, the Commission
permits UITs to register securities retroactively. The Commission re-
ceived authority to permit retroactive registration in 1970, when section
24(f) was added to the 1940 Act; in 1971 the Commission adopted rule
24f-1125 to implement such authority. 126 Rule 24f-1 allows the retroac-
tive registration of securities unregistered for no more than six months if
121. 17 C.F.R. § 270.24f-2 (1987); see Notice for Public Comment of Proposed Rule 24f-2
Under the Investment Company Act of 1940 and of a Proposed Amendment to Rule 24f-1 Under
the Investment Company Act of 1940, Investment Company Act Release No. 9347, [1976-1977
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 80,636, at 86,608 (July 8, 1976) [hereinafter Release
9347].
122. Pub. L. No. 91-547, 84 Stat. 1413, 1424 (1970). Section 24(f) also permits a mutual fund or
a UIT to register retroactively securities sold in excess of the number of securities included in an
effective registration statement of any such company, in accordance with such rules as the Commis-
sion adopts. See infra notes 125-27 and accompanying text.
123. Registration of an Indefinite Number of Investment Company Securities, Investment Com-
pany Act Release No. 13,274, [1982-1983 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,355, at
85,964 (May 26, 1983) (proposing revisions to rule 24f-2). The Commission did not describe those
UITs not normally offering their shares for sale on a continuous basis, but it probably referred to
those UITs for which sponsors were not maintaining a sccondary market.
124. 17 C.F.R. § 270.24f-2(c) (1987). This provision is only available to a registrant who files
the required annual notice within two months after the end of its fiscal year.
125. Id. § 270.24f-1.
126. Adoption of Rule 24f-1 Under the Investment Company Act, Amended, Investment Com-
pany Act Release No. 6805, [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 78,374, at
80,850 (Nov. 5, 1971).
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a filing fee three times the normal fee is paid and a current prospectus
was delivered to persons who purchased the unregistered securities. 127
In 1987 the Commission proposed a registration fee rule to reflect
more closely the business practices of UITs. Proposed rule 24f-3128 rec-
ognizes that most UITs are created through a one-time deposit of speci-
fied securities in a trust, against which a fixed, definite number of trust
units are issued. Because of the relatively fixed nature of a UIT, only
resales and repurchases in the secondary market create the need for a
UIT to rely on the indefinite registration provisions of rule 24f-2. Pro-
posed rule 24f-3 adjusts the fee payment provisions of the securities laws
to the sales activity of UITs by requiring them to register a definite
number of securities when they conduct their initial public offerings and
by permitting them to register an indefinite number of shares, without
paying additional registration fees, for their secondary market resales.
Unlike a mutual fund, which generally issues new shares on a continuous
basis and thus may never lmow how many shares it will issue over a
given period, a UIT generally does not continuously issue new shares.
Because of a UIT's finite nature, if a UIT sponsor resold the same
number of shares it repurchased in a year, it would owe no additional
registration fees under rule 24f-2. Rule 24f-2 merely requires a UIT to
pay registration fees, which are often small, for each year in which re-
sales exceed repurchases. Proposed rule 24f-3 would eliminate this regis-
tration fee on secondary market imbalances (where secondary market
resales exceed repurchases) but require UIT sponsors, like other regis-
trants offering a fixed number of shares, to pay their registration fees at a
date closer to the effective date of their registration statement.
If proposed rule 24f-3 is adopted, section 24(e) should again become
more important. If a UIT is required to register a definite amount of
securities for its initial offering, it could use section 24(e) to amend its
registration statement to register additional securities. Of course, the
proceeds from any new securities issued would have to be invested in the
same sorts of portfolio securities already owned; then the UIT would still
fit within that part of the definition of a UIT requiring it to consist of
"specified securities."
3. UIT Registration Fbrms. Like other issuers, investment com-
panies must register the securities they offer under the 1933 Act. Unlike
127. 17 C.F.R. § 270.24f-l(a), (c) (1987). The six-month and treble-fee provisions implement
the specific language of section 24(f) of the 1940 Act.
128. Registration of an Indefinite Number of Securities by Unit Investment Trusts for Purposes
of Secondary Market Shares, Investment Company Act Release No. 15,611, [1987 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) % 84,108, at 88,548 (Mar. 9, 1987).
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other issuers, however, investment companies must register themselves
under the 1940 Act as well. While this double registration burden has
been somewhat mitigated for most investment companies through the
adoption of registration forms that integrate the filing requirements of
both acts into one form, UITs are the only major type of investment
company for which an integrated registration form has not yet been
adopted. UITs fulfill their 1933 Act requirements by filing on Form S-
6129 and their 1940 Act requirements by filing on Form N-8B-2. 130 Both
of these forms were adopted in 1942,131 and neither has been substan-
tially revised since then. While these forms do require disclosure of use-
ful information, they nonetheless are significantly out of date in that
many matters that are material to prospective purchasers are not specifi-
cally required by the forms. Conversely, other items of disclosure man-
dated by those forms, such as the trust sponsor's financial statements, 132
are no longer required as a matter of staff policy and no longer provided
as a matter of industry practice.
In 1985, the Commission proposed integration of the registration
requirements for UITs. Patterned after Form N-lA, the revised registra-
tion form for mutual funds, proposed Form N-7133 consisted of three
parts: a simplified prospectus, a Statement of Additional Information
(SAI), and other information required only in the registration state-
ment.134 Like the mutual fund SAI, the SAI for UITs would have re-
quired a more detailed discussion of matters not required in the
prospectus but of possible interest to investors, and it would have been
available to prospective investors upon request from the sponsor without
charge. Proposed Form N-7 also would have required inclusion of the
financial statements of certain third parties that guaranteed the payment
of interest or principal of a UIT's portfolio securities. The Commission
explained this proposed requirement by noting the increasing use of these
129. 17 C.F.R. § 239.16.
130. Id § 274.12 (1987).
131. Form S-6 was adopted on December 18, 1942. Securities Act Release No. 2887, 7 Fed.
Reg. 10,653 (1942). Form N-8B-2 was adopted on January 9, 1942. Investment Company Act
Release No. 292, 7 Fed. Reg. 187 (1942).
132. Perplexingly, the Commission continues occasionally to grant confidential treatment to
trust sponsors' financial statements under section 45 of the 1940 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-44 (1982),
although the staff no longer requires them to be filed. See, eg., Sears Corporate Investment Trust,
Investment Company Act Release Nos. 14,543 (May 29, 1985) (notice) & 14,593 (June 21, 1985)
(order); Municipal Investors Trust of America, Series 1 and Subsequent Series, Investment Company
Act Release Nos. 14,893, 51 Fed. Reg. 1889 (Jan. 9, 1986) (notice) & 14,931 (Feb. 5, 1986) (order).
133. Release 6580, supra note 110, at 87,453.
134. Part C of proposed Form N-7, which would have contained the other information required
only in the registration statement, was analogous to part II of the registration statements used by
noninvestment-company issuers.
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third-party guarantees and their importance to prospective investors. 135
Finally, the Commission published draft staff guidelines to assist regis-
trants in preparing Form N-7-the first guidelines for UITs ever pub-
lished. For the most part the guidelines codified existing disclosure
policies.
Proposed Form N-7 generated considerable controversy. Although
commentators lauded the Commission for its initiative in integrating the
1933 and 1940 Acts' registration forms and codifying the disclosure prac-
tices that had developed over the years, they asserted that the Commis-
sion had not sufficiently reduced the amount of required disclosure, that
the disclosures in the SAI would be largely repetitive of those in the pro-
spectus, and that the Commission should not require UIT registration
statements to include the financial statements of third-party guarantors
because of the potential liability that UIT issuers could incur under sec-
tion 11 of the 1933 Act. 136
The Commission reproposed Form N-7 in 1987, partly because of
the siguificant revisions it had made to the form and partly because of an
industry request, made after the original proposal of Form N-7, that
would substantially affect a UIT's own-as opposed to a third party's-
financial statements.1 37 In 1986, the industry requested a relaxation of
the requirement that a UIT maintain current audited financial statements
in its prospectus. A UIT must maintain a current prospectus so that its
sponsor-depositor, which is defined as an "issuer" in section 2(4) of the
1933 Act, 138 may offer units in the secondary market. UIT sponsors as-
serted that, because of the passive and fixed nature of UITs, the costs of
providing annual audited financial statements outweighed the benefits to
investors. In reproposed Form N-7, the Commission agreed to relax the
requirement for audited financial statements in those instances where
they did not seem necessary.
Reproposed Form N-7 contained changes in addition to the relaxa-
tion of the audited financial statements requirement for UITs. Respond-
ing to the criticism of the proposed SAI, the Commission abandoned the
SAI and returned to the two-part format, requiring only the prospectus
and other information required in the registration statement. The Com-
mission also continued to refine the information required in the registra-
tion statement so that a prospectus could be prepared in two parts: one
135. Release 6580, supra note 110, at 87,451.
136. Various categories of persons connected to a registration statement are civilly liable under
section 11 of the 1933 Act for material omissions or untrue statements of a material fact. 15 U.S.C.
§ 77k (1982).
137. Release 6693, supra note 111, at 88,554-55.
138. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(4) (1982).
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part would contain information specific to the series being registered
under the 1933 Act and the other part would contain general information
about the sponsor and the trust that could be used by other series of the
trust. 139 The Commission also proposed to enlarge the third-party finan-
cial statements requirement. Noting that many UITs were now ob-
taining insurance guaranteeing the payment of portfolio securities'
principal or interest, and that the insurance was functionally similar to a
guarantee, the Commission proposed to require UITs to include the fi-
nancial statements of all third parties providing a credit enhancement of
a certain amount. The Commission explained that the third-party en-
hancement might be the critical factor in an investment decision. The
Commission added that noninvestment companies were already required
to include such financial statements by the Commission's accounting reg-
ulations so that investors could assess the ability of a third-party credit
enhancer to meet its commitment in the event of default by an issuer.140
As with the original proposal of Form N-7, reproposed Form N-7
created considerable controversy. Commentators requested that the
Commission revise the specific conditions of the unaudited financial
statements requirement, and they assailed the Commission for adhering
to-and expanding-the requirements for third-party financial state-
ments. Specifically, commentators asserted that the Commission's ex-
panded requirement for third-party financial statements would cause
trust sponsors to cease offering UITs with such credit enhancements.
They also offered a variety of technical suggestions for revision.141
Adopting this integrated registration form remains a priority for the
Commission.
4. UIT Advertising. The rules affecting UIT advertising are vir-
tually identical to those affecting all investment company advertising;
this section thus addresses investment company advertising generically.
Rules 134 and 482 under the 1933 Act142 play an integral role in invest-
139. This refinement, which is similar to the way in which some trust sponsors already assemble
their prospectuses, offers several benefits. First, to the extent that the generic portion of the prospec-
tus is truly generic, that part of the prospectus could be used again for future series of the UIT.
Second, as long as the generic part of the prospectus remains accurate, the sponsor need not revise it
for resales in the secondary market, which, as noted earlier, must be made pursuant to a current
prospectus.
140. Release 6693, supra note 111, at 88,559-60; see also 17 C.F.R. § 210.3-10 (1987) (rule 3-10
of regulation S-X); Securities Act Release No. 33-6359, 46 Fed. Reg. 56,171 (1981) (adopting revi-
sions to regulation S-X).
141. The comment letters discussing reproposed Form N-7 are available for public inspection
and copying in the Commission's Public Reference Room, 450 Fifth Street, N.W., Washington, D.C.
20549. File No. S7-9-87.
142. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.134, 230.482 (1987).
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ment company advertising, while rules 135a and 156143 play a secondary
role.
Until 1979, investment company registrants were subject to the
same constraints as other issuers under the 1933 Act, which, with certain
exceptions, limits public communications offering securities to statutory
prospectuses. The "tombstone rule," rule 134, is one exception to the
1933 Act's general proscription; it allows issuers to announce the exist-
ence of their public offering and the availability of a prospectus without
triggering the definition of "prospectus" found in section 2(10) of the
1933 Act.144 The rule contains special provisions for investment compa-
nies and, among other things, allows an investment company to provide a
general description of itself and include an attention-getting headline.1 45
The use of any performance figure, however, is specifically prohibited. 146
Rule 482147 is the other major exception to the general prohibition
on any communications other than the statutory prospectus. Adopted in
1979,148 this rule permits an investment company to include more infor-
mation than allowed under the tombstone rule.149 It does not limit the
contents of advertisements provided that the substance of any informa-
tion in an ad is contained in the statutory prospectus and the ad states
where a statutory prospectus can be obtained and advises the investor to
read it before investing. Rule 482 thus allows a UIT to advertise any
performance figure as long as its statutory prospectus contains a discus-
sion of the type of performance figure advertised.1 50
Rule 156 replaced the Commission's Statement of Policy, which was
a detailed statement of the staff's views of sales literature. The rule gov-
erns the sales literature-the material that accompanies or follows a stat-
utory prospectus-of investment companies. The rule states the
requirement of the federal securities laws that sales literature not be mis-
143. Id. §§ 230.135a, 230.156.
144. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(10) (1982).
145. 17 C.F.R. § 134(a)(3)(iii) (1987); see also id. § 134(a)(13) (communication may include de-
scriptions of corporations and their products and services as long as description does not relate
directly to desirability of purchasing securities of a registered investment company).
146. Id. § 230.134(a)(3)(iii).
147. rd. § 230.482.
148. Advertising by Investment Companies, Investment Company Act Release No. 10,852,
[1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,198, at 82,254 (Aug. 31, 1979).
149. Rule 482 was adopted under section 10(b) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77j(b) (1982), which
authorizes the Commission to permit prospectuses that omit in part or summarize the information in
the statutory prospectus. Ads falling under rule 482 are thus known as "omitting prospectus" ads
and carry prospectus liability under section 12 of the 1933 Act, id. § 77.
150. Mutual funds and insurance company separate accounts offering variable annuity contracts,
however, are restricted in the types and presentation of performance figures they may advertise. See
Advertising by Investment Companies, Securities Act Release No. 6753, [Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 84,217, at 88,990-99 (Feb. 2, 1988) [hereinafter Release 6753].
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leading, and it provides general guidance on some factors that could
make sales literature misleading. 151 Rule 135a, 152 however, allows in-
vestment companies to use generic ads containing only explanatory lan-
guage as long as they mention no investment company or its securities by
name.
5. Secondary Market Prospectus. As noted earlier, a UIT sponsor
is considered an issuer of trust units under section 2(4) of the 1933 Act.
While secondary market sales are usually not subject to the 1933 Act
once the offering has "come to rest," the courts and the Commission
have consistently taken the position that all securities offered or sold by
an issuer, unless otherwise exempt, are subject to the 1933 Act, notwith-
standing the fact that the securities may have been previously sold pursu-
ant to a registration statement.1 53  A UIT sponsor therefore must
maintain a current prospectus if it creates a secondary market in trust
units.
The maintenance of a secondary market by a UIT sponsor creates
legal obligations for others. As long as the sponsor offers units for sale,
any dealer in units of that trust must also deliver a prospectus because
section 24(d) of the 1940 Act a54 eliminates the dealer's exception pro-
vided by section 4(3) of the 1933 Act.1 55 Section 24(d) was amended in
1954 to eliminate the dealer's exception with respect to securities issued
by mutual funds and UITs, on the basis that securities continuously of-
fered to the public by an issuer justified a requirement that all dealers be
compelled to use the statutory prospectus.1 56 A significant "third mar-
ket"-a secondary market maintained by persons other than the spon-
sors and underwriters of UITs-has arisen in the last two years. Dealers
151. Mutual Fund Sales Literature Interpretative Rule, Investment Company Act Release No.
10,915, [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,337, at 82,432 (Nov. 7, 1979).
Newly adopted rule 34b-1, which affects only the sales literature of mutual funds and insurance
company separate accounts offering variable annuity contracts, requires investment companies that
advertise performance figures in their sales literature to include certain uniformly computed per-
formance figures in addition to any nonstandardized figures used. See Release 6753, supra note 150,
at 88,999.
152. 17 C.F.R. § 230.135a (1987).
153. See, e-g., SEC v. Stanwood Oil Corp., 516 F. Supp. 1181, 1184 (W.D. Pa. 1981); First
MultiFund for Daily Income, Inc. v. United States, 602 F.2d 332, 335-36 (Ct. Cl. 1979), cert. denied,
445 U.S. 916 (1980); Release 9677, supra note 118, at 87,670; Release 6693, supra note 111, at
88,554 n.2.
154. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-24(d) (1982).
155. Id. § 77d(3). Section 4(3) excepts dealers, under certain circumstances, from the prospec-
tus delivery requirements of section 5 of the 1933 Act, id. § 77e.
156. H.R. REP. No. 1542, supra note 114, at 29-30, reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 3002-03.
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operating in this market should note the requirement that they deliver
prospectuses in these circumstances.
B. Dividend Distributions.
Section 19 of the 1940 Act 57 governs the disclosures that must be
made when an investment company pays a dividend and the frequency
with which an investment company can distribute long-term capital
gains.
As originally enacted, section 19 dealt only with the disclosure of
investment company dividends.15 8 Ironically, while fixed trusts were
found to have inadequately disclosed the nature of their distributions,15 9
and while section 19 applies to UITs as well as all other investment com-
panies, UITs are not subject to the only disclosure rule adopted under
section 19. Rule 19a-l, 160 adopted in 1941,161 applies only to manage-
ment investment companies, although the reason for this distinction is
unknown. The distinction is not academic, however, because the rule
requires more disclosure than does section 19 alone. Specifically, the rule
requires management investment companies to disclose any payments to
shareholders reflecting (1) accumulated, undistributed net profits from
the sale of securities or other properties, or (2) paid-in surplus or other
157. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-19 (1982).
158. Pub. L. No. 76-768, § 19, 54 Stat. 789, 821 (1940) (applicable to "any registered investment
company"), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE INVESTMENT COMPANY AND INVEST-
MENT ADVISERS ACT OF 1940, at 37 (1940) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]. The Commis-
sion's proposed section 19 differed significantly from that ultimately enacted as law. The
Commission's proposal to prohibit an investment company from paying any dividend out of any
source other than undistributed net income, unless the payment of a dividend from such other source
was (1) expressly permitted by the company's charter and (2) accompanied by a written statement
fully disclosing the source of such dividend and offering the recipient an opportunity to reinvest such
dividend in the company without sales load. Hearings 3580, supra note 7, at 14. The Commission
was concerned that the imposition of sales loads by investment companies on the reinvestment of
capital distributions would result in gradual depletion of an investor's funds. Id. at 275 (statement
of L.M.C. Smith, Associate Counsel, SEC Investment Trust Study). The Commission's proposed
section 19 also prohibited investment companies from paying dividends on a security unless a certain
asset coverage existed with respect to any securities senior to that receiving the dividend. Id at 14.
As enacted, section 19 simply prohibited companies from paying dividends out of any source other
than accumulated undistributed net income or net income for the current or preceeding fiscal year,
unless such dividend was accompanied by a written statement adequately disclosing the source of
such dividend. LEGISLATIVE HisTOIty, supra, at 37.
159. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
160. 17 C.F.R. § 270.19a-I (1987).
161. 6 Fed. Reg. 1113 (adopted on Feb. 25, 1941). Rule 19a-1 was last amended in 1973 to make
certain technical revisions, but nothing was stated as to why it did not apply to UITs. See Technical
Amendments to Rules 2a-l, 2a-2, 7d-l, 19a-l and 30d-1 under the Investment Company Act of 1940
to Conform in the Rules References to Certain Sections of the Act as Amended by the Investment
Company Act of 1970, Investment Company Release No. 7703, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 79,248, at 82,743 (Mar. 5, 1973).
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capital,1 62 neither of which must be disclosed by UITs.
In 1970, section 19 was amended 63 to govern the frequency with
which investment companies distribute capital gains. Once again, the
legislative and administrative history of this provision raises questions.
The Commission was on record seeking an amendment to section 19,
primarily because it believed that fund managers were being pressured
into frequent capital gains distributions that disadvantaged shareholders
with respect to income tax liability.164 While the Commission noted that
the mutual funds' trade association had published a guide consistent with
the revisions to section 19 that the Commission sought, it also noted that
the guide did not bind the trade association's members 165 -and, of
course, nonmembers would not even be affected by the guide. Moreover,
in adopting and proposing to revise rule 19b-1 166 -the rule implementing
amended section 19-the Commission noted that the rule would dimin-
ish problems associated with managed funds. For example, the rule
would lessen the temptation to "chum" a portfolio to realize capital
gains on a frequent and regular basis. 167 Despite this focus on managed
funds, however, rule 19b-1 applies to all registered investment compa-
nies, including unmanaged funds such as UITs. 168
The Commission subsequently amended rule 19b-1 to exempt UITs
from the rule's prohibition in five situations where events that created the
capital gains were substantially independent from any action by the UIT
sponsor or trustee.169 In so doing, the Commission articulated a ration-
162. 17 C.F.R. § 270.19a-l(a)(2), (3).
163. Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-547, 84 Stat. 1413, 1422.
164. PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS, supra note 34, at 194-95.
165. Id. at 194.
166. 17 C.F.R. § 270.19b-1 (1987).
167. Adoption of Rule 19b-1 Under the Investment Company Act of 1940 Limiting the Fre-
quency of Distributions of Capital Gains by Registered Investment Companies, Investment Com-
pany Act Release No. 6834. [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L Rep. (CCI) 178416, at
80,917 (Nov. 23, 1971); Notice of Proposal to Adopt Rule 19b-1 Under the Investment Company
Act Limiting the Frequency of Distributions of Capital Gains by Registered Investment Companies,
Investment Company Act Release No. 6735, [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCI)
78,308, at 80,727 (Oct. 1, 1971); Rule Proposal for Unit Investment Trust Start-Up Exemptions and
Proposed Revision of Rule Regarding Pricing of Investment Company Shares Generally, Investment
Company Act Release No. 10,545, [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCI) 81,911, at
81,142 (Jan. 8, 1979) [hereinafter Release 10,545].
168. Rule 19b-1 essentially prohibits registered investment companies from making more than
one capital gain distribution in any one taxable year. The rule was recently amended to allow regis-
tered investment companies to make an additional distribution of long-term capital gains for the
purpose of avoiding a special excise tax. Investment Company Act Release No. 16,094, 52 Fed. Reg.
42,426 (1987).
169. Release 10,545, supra note 139, at 81,142-43; Unit Investment Trust Start-Up Exemptions,
Final Rules, Investment Company Act Release No. 10,690, [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 82,074, at 81,778-79 (May 15, 1979) [hereinafter Release 10,690]. The five UIT exceptions
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ale for rule 19b-1 that UITs found more convincing: the rule was also
intended to prevent investor confusion that might arise if capital gains
distributions were commingled with distributions of ordinary income.170
C. Payments to Affiliates, Substitution of Securities,
and "Orphan" Trusts.
Section 26 of the 1940 Act 171 governs a variety of integral aspects of
a UIT, including who may serve as trustee or custodian and how the
trustee or custodian must keep custody of trust assets. Three of the sec-
tion's subprovisions deserve special mention, however, because of the
problems they attempted to resolve and the manner in which these sub-
provisions changed over time.
As drafted by the Commission, the first subprovision, section
26(a)(2)(C), prohibited a trust sponsor or underwriter from using inter-
state commerce unless the trust's indenture prohibited the trustee from
paying the depositor or underwriter, or their affiliates, any expense. 172
This subprovision attempted unequivocally to eliminate the many ex-
penses paid, over and above the sales load, to the promoters of UITs. By
the time of its enactment, however, the subprovision had been revised so
that the Commission could permit "reasonable" fees to be paid to pro-
moters for bookkeeping and "other administrative services" normally
performed by the custodian itself.173 Little was said in the legislative
history about this modification, although the report of the House Com-
mittee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce stated that "except under
special circumstances" such fees were not to be paid to either the deposi-
tor or underwriter.1 74
Over forty years later, in 1984, the Commission proposed a rule to
codify certain relief it had granted under section 26(a)(2)(C). This pro-
posal shed new light on the subject of fees paid to UIT insiders. In pro-
posing rule 26a-1,175 the Commission declared that the purpose of
section 26(a)(2)(C) was to prohibit the depositor from "'reaping hidden
from the capital gains distribution restriction are: (I) when an issuer calls a UIT's portfolio security,
(2) when a UIT sells a portfolio security to meet redemptions and distributes the excess, (3) when a
UIT sells a portfolio security to maintain its qualification as a "regulated investment company"
under the Internal Revenue Code, (4) regular distributions and prepayment of principal on portfolio
securities, such as, Government National Mortgage Association (GNMA) securities, and (5) sales of
portfolio securities to maintain the investment stability of the UIT. Id.
170. Release 10,545, supra note 167, at 81,143.
171. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-26 (1982).
172. Hearings 3580, supra note 7, at 18.
173. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-26(a)(2)(C) (1982).
174. H.R. REP. No. 2639, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 22 (1940).
175. 17 C.F.R. § 270.26a-I (1987).
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profits' through purported administrative fees." 176 Congress had associ-
ated "hidden loads" and "hidden charges" with UITs.177 In its report on
fixed trusts, the Commission had delineated many of the "hidden loads"
associated with UITs, such as the sales load on the spread between the
bid and the offering side, and the sale of portfolio securities to the trust at
odd-lot prices although the securities had been obtained at a round-lot
price. In its proposal, the Commission completed the distinction be-
tween "hidden loads" and "hidden charges" through its discussion of
"purported administrative fees." In the release accompanying the pro-
posed rule, the Commission announced its interpretation that section 26
permits a payment from trust assets for administrative fees provided that
the fees do not exceed the estimated cost of the services provided. 78
That is, the services must be provided at cost. The Commission reiter-
ated its insistence on the "at cost" standard when it adopted rule 26a-
1.179 The Commission rejected a commentator's suggestion that the rule
be modified to permit a "reasonable" profit in any administrative fee,
declaring that the 1940 Act and its legislative history "unambiguously
demonstrate" that Congress intended to prohibit persons related to the
trust sponsor from using administrative fees to realize "hidden prof-
its."180 The Commission also rejected a suggestion that the rule be re-
vised to permit administrative fees "approximately" equal to the cost of
the services provided.1 81
The second subprovision, section 26(a)(3),1 12 addresses the "or-
phan" trust problem discussed earlier.8 3 The Commission had sought to
prohibit the depositor of a trust from resigning or from assigning any of
its rights or duties unless the Commission by order allowed such action,
and to prohibit a trustee from resiguing unless a successor trustee had
been appointed by a court or the Commission by order had consented to
such resiguation.1 84 Instead of adopting the Commission's proposal,
Congress adopted section 26(a)(3), which prohibits the trustee from re-
176. Payment of Administrative Fees to the Depositor or Principal Underwriter of a Unit In-
vestment Trust, Investment Company Act Release No. 13,705, [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,473, at 86,512 (Jan. 9, 1984) [hereinafter Release 13,705].
177. S. REp. No. 1775, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 8 (1940). The Commission echoed Congress in
these concerns. 10 SEC ANN. REP. 160 (1944). For a discussion of "hidden loads" and "hidden
charges," see supra text accompanying notes 50-67.
178. Release 13,705, supra note 176, at 86,513.
179. 17 C.F.R. § 270.26a-1 (1987).
180. Investment Company Act Release No. 14,065, [1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) % 83,646, at 86,974 (July 27, 1984).
181. Id.
182. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-26(a)(3) (1982).
183. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
184. Hearings 3580, supra note 7, at 18.
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signing unless the trust has been completely liquidated and its proceeds
distributed to the security holders of the trust or a successor trustee,
meeting the same standards that are required of an initial trustee, has
agreed to act as trustee.185 Even though the staff of the Commission
compared the problem of depositors assigning their depositorship to that
of fund managers selling their management contract,1 86 the prohibition
against such an assignment by a trust depositor-for some unexplained
reason-was deleted.
The third subprovision, section 26(a)(4), 18 7 involves portfolio substi-
tutions. It requires a depositor, within five days after a substitution, to
deliver or mail to unitholders a notice of substitution that identifies the
securities substituted and eliminated. Although enacted as originally
proposed by the Commission, this subprovision was later revisited by the
Commission with only partial success. In its 1966 report to Congress
entitled the "Public Policy Implications of Investment Company
Growth," the Commission recommended an amendment to section 26 to
require that substitutions be prohibited unless approved by the Commis-
sion under the same standard found in section 6(c) of the 1940 Act.188
The report expressed the Commission's concern that a shareholder in a
UIT is seldom in a position to judge the merits of the substituted secur-
ity, and that his only recourse in the event of a substitution would be to
redeem his shares and probably lose the large sales load common to most
UITs. 189
Despite the Commission's recommendation, however, this problem
received more limited treatment in the 1970 amendments. The Invest-
ment Company Amendments Act of 1970 added section 26(b),190 which
prohibits a depositor or trustee of a trust holding the security of a single
issuer to substitute securities without prior approval by the Commission,
185. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-26(a)(3) (1982).
186. Hearings 3580, supra note 7, at 300 (statement of John H. Hollands, SEC staff attorney).
Section 26 contains other, unchanged provisions designed to prevent "orphan" trusts. Section
26(a)(2)(A) allows the trustec, if not otherwise remunerated, to charge the trust from its income, and
from the corpus if no income is available, for the expenses provided the trustee in the trust indenture.
Section 26(d) allows the Commission to seck liquidation of "orphan" trusts in federal district court.
187. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-26(a)(4) (1982).
188. PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS, supra note 34, at 337; see also 15 U.S.C. § 80a-6(c) (1982).
Section 6(c) allows the Commission "conditionally or unconditionally [to] exempt any person, secur-
ity, or transaction from any [or all of the 1940 Act or the rules] thereunder, if... such exemption is
necessary or appropriate in the public interest and consistent with the protection of investors and the
purposes fairly intended by the policy and provisions [of the 1940 Act]." Id.
189. The report even mentioned a past Commission position in which the Commission aggres-
sively asserted that the substitution of portfolio shares of a UIT constituted an offer of exchange
under section 11 of the 1940 Act and was prohibited unless exempted by the Commission. PUBLIC
POLICY IMPLICATIONS, supra note 34, at 337.
190. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-26(b) (1982).
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using essentially the same standard as in section 6(c) of the 1940 Act. 191
The 1970 Amendments Act thus reflected congressional concern with
substitutions in those specialized trusts that invest in only one issuer-
UITs that generally serve as vehicles for investing in mutual funds. The
staff of the Commission has remained concerned about the ability of
UITs to substitute securities and, as later discussed, 192 has asserted that
substitution shond occur only under extraordinary circumstances.
D. Affiliated Transactions.
Section 17 of the 1940 Act' 93 comprehensively regulates all invest-
ment companies' affiliated transactions (which, with UITs, are transac-
tions between a UIT and its sponsor or principal underwriter), but the
section excepts from its coverage the one type of aTfliated transaction
most likely to occur with a UIT. More specifically, section 17(a)(1) pro-
hibits an affiliated person of an investment company from knowingly sell-
ing any security or 'other property to the company, but section
17(a)(1)(C) excepts such a transaction from the provisions of section 17 if
the sale involves only securities deposited with the trustee of a UIT by
the depositor.' 94 Because a UIT is a fixed entity and would rarely
purchase or sell securities after it is organized, the exception provided by
section 17(a)(1)(C) makes the prohibitions of section 17(a) inapplicable
to all but the occasional elimination or substitution in which the UIT
depositor intended to purchase the security to be disposed of by the
trust. 195
While the mechanics and background to section 17 were much dis-
cussed,196 and an additional statutory exception to section 17(a)(1) was
191. Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-547, 84 Stat. 1413, 1424
(requiring Commission actions to be "consistent with the protection of investors and the purposes
fairly intended by the policy and provisions of this title"); see also 15 U.S.C. § 80a-6(c) (1982)
(same).
192. See infra note 246 and accompanying text.
193. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17 (1982).
194. Id. § 80a-17(a)(1)(C). When the sale from the sponsor to the UIT involves some asset in
addition to securities, an order exempting such sale under section 17 may be necessary. See Sears
Investment Trust, Dual Value Series Six, Investment Company Act Release Nos. 16,058 (Oct. 26,
1987) (notice) & 16,125 (Nov. 12, 1987) (order).
195. For examples of portfolio eliminations in which a UIT obtained exemptive relief from sec-
tion 17(a)(2) of the 1940 Act to sell its portfolio securities to its sponsor, see Dean Witter Reynolds,
Investment Company Act Release Nos. 15,311, 51 Fed. Reg. 33,681 (Sept. 16, 1986) (noticc) &
15,356 (Oct. 10, 1986) (order); Paine Webber, Investment Company Act Release Nos. 15,399, 51
Fed. Reg. 41,193 (Nov. 5, 1986) (noticc) & 15,451 (Dec. 3, 1986) (order).
196. See Hearings 3580, supra note 7, at 256-65 (statement of David Schenker, Chief Counsel,
SEC Investment Trust Study); id. at 1055-56 (statement of Arthur H. Bunker, Executive Vice Presi-
dent, Lehman Corporation); S. REP. No. 1775, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 7 (1940); H.R. REP. No. 2639,
76th Cong., 3d Sess. 17-18 (1940).
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added, 197 Congress provided no explanation as to why it excepted the
affiliated transaction most common with UITs from the coverage of sec-
tion 17. The Comission's draft legislation contained this statutory excep-
tion to the prohibitions of section 17, and it was not substantially
modified as the law was enacted. 198 The exception may have resulted
from a recognition that most UITs were created through just these sorts
of affiliated transactions, and that forcing them to obtain exemptive relief
(a transaction subject to section 17(a) is prohibited unless the Commis-
sion grants exemptive relief under section 17(b)) at this inceptive stage
might irreparably detain them from reaching the market. Alternatively,
the exception may have arisen from the belief that disclosure of the vari-
ous fees a depositor made upon the deposit into the trust could effectively
solve the problem. Another possibility is that the Commission's draft
legislation contained this exception as a political accommodation to the
UIT industry.
E. Size of Investment Companies.
Section 14 of the 1940 Act199 changed as dramatically as any of the
provisions in the Commission's draft legislation. As enacted, section 14
required that registered investment companies have a minimum net
worth of $100,000 to make a public offering; the Commission's draft leg-
islation contained the same minimum capital requirement but also would
have limited the maximum size of investment companies. UITs, for in-
stance, would have been limited in size to $150,000,000.200 David Schen-
ker, Chief Counsel to the Commission's Investment Trust Study,
acknowledged that such a limitation presented problems, but he de-
fended the provision because of the possibility of a "run on the com-
pany. ' 20 1 A run on an investment company issuing redeemable
securities, he declared, was no different from a run on a bank, and could
result in an undesirable effect on the stock market and an illiquid invest-
ment for investment company shareholders slow to redeem their
shares.202 Another theory offered for the maximum size limitation was
that such a limitation would prevent investment companies from serving
197. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(a)(1)(B); LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 158, at 30.
198. Hearings 3580, supra note 7, at 12; LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 158, at 30.
199. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-14 (1982).
200. Hearings 3580, supra note 7, at 10-11. Furthermore, the Commission's draft legislation
would have prohibited a person from serving as investment adviser or manager of an investment
company if she was already acting in such a capacity with other investment companies whose total
assets exceeded certain limitations. Id.
201. Id. at 245-47.
202. Id. at 247.
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as disguised holding companies. 20 3 Representatives of the investment
company industry opposed this limitation, however,2°4 and it was re-
placed by a provision that authorized the Commission to study and re-
port to Congress on the size of investment companies and their effect on
the securities markets, the concentration of wealth, and the companies in
which they invest.205
The minimum size limits of the Commission's proposed section 14
also received critical scrutiny; however, the suggested $100,000 floor was
enacted-perhaps because of the staff's concern over "fly-by-night" op-
erators.20 6 Section 14(a)(2), however, excepts an investment company
from the $100,000 minimum capital requirement if it has previously
made a public offering of its securities and had a net worth of at least
$100,000 at that time. While many UITs organized today may not be
concerned with this low threshold, those organized in series form as part
of a single trust registered under the 1940 Act might be able to rely on
the offerings of the other series within the trust, as long as one of the
prior series qualified under section 14(a)(2).207
Rule 14a-320 creates another exception-solely for UITs-to the
minimum capital requirements of the 1940 Act. Premised on the realiza-
tion that a UIT requires much less commitment than a managed invest-
ment company,20 9 the rule exempts a UIT from section 14(a) of the 1940
Act if the trust holds at least $100,000 of certain portfolio securities210 at
the commencement of the offering. The rule also requires, however, that
each UIT purchaser receive his pro rata share of the UIT's net worth,
plus a refund of all sales charges paid on the purchase of UIT units, if the
203. J. SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 227 (1982).
204. Hearings 3580, supra note 7, at 1058; Hearings on HR. 10,065 Before a Subcomm. of the
House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 98 (1940) [hereinafter
Hearings 10,065].
205. This change has been characterized as among the major concessions made by the Commis-
sion in the 1940 Act. J. SELIGMAN, supra note 203, at 228-29.
206. Hearings 10,065, supra note 204, at 116-20.
207. Seetion 14(a)(2) has never formally been interpreted by the staff. Whether it would con-
strue the various discrete series of a UIT to constitute "such company" within the meaning of sec-
tion 14(a)(2) is not certain.
208. 17 C.F.R. § 270.14a-3 (1987).
209. Release 10,545, supra note 167, at 81,141.
210. While the relief granted by rule 14a-3 is available essentially only to UITs investing in
certain types of debt obligations, exemptive relief has been given to UITs adhering to the conditions
of the rule that invest in convertible and common stock as well. See, e.g., Prudential-Bache Securi-
ties, Unit Investment Trust Exemptions, Investment Company Act Release Nos. 15,622, 52 Fed.
Reg. 9228 (Mar. 13, 1987) (notice) & 15,671 (Apr. 8, 1987) (order); E.F. Hutton & Company, In-
vestment Company Act Release Nos. 14,589 (June 21, 1985) (notice) & 14,635 (July 16, 1985) (or-
der); E.F. Hutton & Company and Hutton Telephone Trust First Tax-Free Exchange Series and
Subsequent Series, Investment Company Act Release Nos. 13,514 (Sept. 19, 1983) (notice) & 13,579
(Oct. 17, 1983) (order).
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net worth of the trust declines to less than $100,000 within ninety days
after the effectiveness of its registration statement or if the trust fails to
become a going concern. The rule further requires the trustee to termi-
nate the trust and distribute its assets if redemptions by the sponsor or
any underwriter of units that constitute a part of the unsold units result
in the trust having a net worth of less than forty percent of the principal
amount of the securities initially deposited in the trust. While the rule
requires termination of a UIT and distribution of its assets when certain
conditions are not met, the refund of sales charges to unitholders is con-
ditioned upon the demand for such a refund by the unitholders. 211 The
demand requirement probably originates with section 14(a)(3)(C), which
contains a similar demand provision with respect to a different exception
to the minimum capital requirements.
F. Exchange Offers.
Section 11 of the 1940 Act,212 which governs exchange offers,
scarcely resembles the provision that the Commission originally pro-
posed and titled "recurrent promotion of investment companies." The
Commission's draft legislation would have prohibited any promoter of a
registered investment company from serving as adviser, officer, director,
depositor, trustee, or principal underwriter if such person had promoted
another investment company within the previous five years. The draft
included a provision enabling investment companies to apply for exemp-
tion from the five-year prohibition.213 David Schenker explained the pro-
vision by stating that "one cannot organize bank after bank, one camot
organize insurance company after insurance company, and we feel that
they should not be allowed to organize investment trust after investment
trust. ' 214 Schenker criticized the industry's emphasis on distribution and
associated this emphasis with the need to continue generating merchan-
dise to sell. As one investment lost its appeal, others were formed, and
investors were persuaded to switch into the new companies. Schenker
noted that as many as six switches had occurred in the fixed trust area
and that "switching operations" particularly disadvantaged small inves-
tors.21 5 Schenker conceded that the five-year moratorium on promotion
was an arbitrary period, but he asserted that any shorter period would
result in the recurrence of switching associated with fixed trusts in the
211. 17 C.F.R. §§ 270.14a-3(a)(2)(i), (a)(3)(ii) (1987).
212. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-II (1982).
213. Hearings 3580, supra note 7, at 9.
214. Id. at 227.
215. Id.; Hearings 10,065, supra note 204, at 59.
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Despite the criticism of the industry's distribution practices, section
11 changed significantly, partly because of industry opposition to the
Commission's proposed legislation. 217 Section 1l's focus shifted from
how many investment companies one could organize during a given pe-
riod to the price one could charge an investor who exchanged shares of
one investment company for another. This shift more closely addressed
the staff's concern with exchanges-that investors were losing their prin-
cipal as the result of multiple exchanges. As enacted, section 11 (c) re-
quired that the terms of any exchange involving UIT securities be
approved in advance by the Commission or comply with any rules pre-
scribed by the Commission. In contrast, section 11 (a) merely required
mutual funds to comply with Commission rules and to seek Commission
approval ouly if the exchange offer were made on the basis of something
other than the relative net assets of the shares to be exchanged. 218
In December 1986, the Commission proposed a mle to exempt cer-
tain exchanges between UITs from section 11 coverage.219 Proposed rule
1ic-i would permit a UIT or its sponsor or principal underwriter to
make an exchange offer to unitholders of another series of the same UIT,
or to unitholders of another UIT having the same sponsor, on the basis of
the relative net asset values of the respective units. The proposed rule
would also permit the imposition of a sales load on such an exchange if,
among other things, the sales load charged was no greater than the ex-
cess, if any, of the sales load applicable to the acquired unit over the sales
load previously paid on the exchanged unit.220 Unlike its companion,
proposed rule 1 la-3, 221 which would exempt certain mutual fund ex-
changes, proposed rule 1 lc-1 would not provide for the imposition of an
administrative fee on an exchange transaction.222 The Commission ex-
plained that no UIT applicants had yet requested an exemption to charge
unitholders such fees.
216. Hearings 3580, supra note 7, at 227.
217. While at least one representative of the industry, albeit from the ranks of the management
companies, acknowledged that the testimony revealed that switching occurred among fixed trusts,
the industry nonetheless sought complete elimination of section 11. Id. at 540, 1058.
218. The revision of section 11, like that of section 14, has been characterized as one of the major
concessions made by the Commission in the 1940 Act. 3. SELiGMAN, supra note 203, at 228-29.
219. Offers of Exchange Involving Open-End Investment Companies and Unit Investment
Trusts, Investment Company Act Release No. 15,494, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CC) 1 84,051, at 88,387 (Dec. 23, 1986).
220. Id.
221. IML at 88,386.
222. Itl at 88,388.
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G. Pricing of Securities.
Section 22 of the 1940 Act223 regulates the pricing of redeemable
securities issued by an investment company, whether in the distribution,
redemption, or repurchase context. Leaving aside subsection 22(d)'s
much analyzed price-fixing exemption, which affects mutual funds and
UITs equally and thus is not discussed herein, section 22 permits the
Commission to prescribe rules governing the calculation of the price of
investment company shares. These rules exist to eliminate or reduce as
far as reasonably practicable any dilution in the value of such companies'
outstanding securities, or other result unfair to the companies' current
shareholders.224 These were not theoretical problems; with respect to
UITs, Congress noted thai dilution of shareholders' equity and riskless
trading profits "have not been unusual." 225
Rule 22c-1226 was adopted to eliminate dilution and certain specula-
tive trading practices associated with investment company redeemable
securities, such as riskless trading, through the use of "forward pric-
ing."' 227 The rule subsequently was amended to treat UIT securities
somewhat differently from other investment company redeemable securi-
ties. In 1979, the Commission proposed to codify existing exemptive or-
ders for UITs by permitting a UIT sponsor to use backward pricing-to
sell and repurchase trust units at a price based on the last business day of
the previous week-for its secondary market. 228 The Commission had
granted these exemptions in recognition that the sponsor's secondary
market activities were completely independent of the UIT and in no way
involved the trust's assets. The proposed relief was conditioned upon the
sponsor selling and repurchasing trust units at a price based on the offer-
ing-side evaluation. This practice would prevent the trust from being
depleted, because liquidating unitholders would not have their units re-
223. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22 (1982).
224. Section 22, as originally drafted by the Commission, also contained a provision allowing the
Commission to challenge any offer of an investment company share that included an unconscionable
or grossly excessive sales load. In the case of a UIT, for instance, the Commission would have been
able to serve a notice upon the UIT'; sponsor to appear and show cause why such sales load should
not be prohibited. If after hearing the evidence the Commission found that the depositor was selling
the securities at a price including an unconscionable or grossly excessive sales load, the Commission
would have been able to order the company to cease and desist from selling at such price. Hearings
3580, supra note 7, at 15-16. Like other portions of the Commission's draft legislation, this provi-
sion was never enacted.
225. S. REP. No. 1775, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 8 (1940).
226. 17 C.F.R. § 270.22c-l (1987).
227. Prior to rule 22c-1, "backwards pricing" had existed, which created opportunities for
riskless trading and dilution of an investment company's net asset value through its reliance on a
price previously established.
228. Release 10,545, supra note 167, at 81,146.
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deemed but would have their units repurchased by the sponsor at the
"bid" price and thus realize the spread between the "bid" and "offering"
price of the portfolio securities. The Commission proposed to allow a
UIT to use the price computed on the last business day of each week,
effective for all sales made during the following week, if, in the case of
repurchases, the current bid price was not higher than the offering-side
evaluation, computed on the last busiuess day of the previous week, and
if, in the case of resales, the offering-side evaluation, computed as of the
last business day of the previous week, was not more than one-half of one
percent greater than the current offering price.
The Commission adopted the proposed amendments to rule 22c-1
with minor modifications, 229 but, ironically, the industry has moved
away from using the offering side for the secondary market and thus no
longer takes advantage of the more favorable UIT pricing provisions of
rule 22c-1. By late 1987, nearly all of the major UIT sponsors had begun
using the bid side for their secondary market activities.230 This, of
course, leaves the unitholder indifferent as to whether his shares are re-
deemed by the trust or repurchased by the trust sponsor. It also brings
the secondary market for UIT securities back into conformity with the
secondary market for most other securities, which trade on the bid side.
Backward pricing is still permitted, not only by rule 22c-1, but also
by exemptive relief given since the revision of that rule. Several UIT
sponsors have obtained exemptive relief from rule 22c-1 in order to sell
uiits in their UITs on the first business day of the initial offering period
at a public offering price determined as of the preceding day.231 They
have sought this relief to prevent confusion among their investors who,
upon reading the trusts' prospectuses, arguably have not realized that the
prices shown therein would not be the prices they would pay and, indeed,
that they would pay a higher price if the price of the portfolio securities
increased on or before the date of deposit. Although the registrants who
have obtained this relief to use backward pricing have contended that
such pricing would significantly reduce investor confusion, they have
nonetheless stated that they would use backward pricing where it benefits
229. Release 10,690, supra note 169, at 81,779.
230. As late as 1985, a number of sponsors were still repurchasing at the offering side in the
secondary market. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., Investment Company Act Re-
lease No. 14,684, 50 Fed. Reg. 34,563 (Aug. 19, 1985).
231. Salomon Brothers Unit Investment Trust, Insured Tax-Exempt Series One, Investment
Company Act Release Nos. 15,531 (Jan. 13, 1987) (second notice) & 15,574 (Feb. 12, 1987) (order);
First Trust of Insured Municipal Bonds, Investment Company Act Release Nos. 15,615 (Mar. 10,
1987) (notice) & 15,688 (Apr. 16, 1987) (order); Kemper Tax Exempt Trust, Investment Company
Act Release Nos. 15,022 (Mar. 31, 1986) (notice) & 15,064 (Apr. 22, 1986) (order).
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unitholders, that is, where the price of a unit decreases on the date of
deposit.
IV. OTHER FIXED PORTFOLIO INVESTMENT VEHICLES
Not all investment vehicles with fixed portfolios register as UITs
under the 1940 Act. Some have registered as closed-end investment
companies 232 and, because of their similarity to UITs, have received ex-
emptive relief from certain provisions of the 1940 Act. Other fixed port-
folio investment vehicles have received conditional exemptive relief from
the entire 1940 Act and thus have not registered under the Act. A third
type of fixed portfolio investment vehicle has qualified for the real estate
company exception found in section 3(c)(5)(C) of the 1940 Act 233 and
therefore need not register under the 1940 Act. Not only have these
companies received exemptions from some or all of the 1940 Act, they
also are sometimes entitled to special treatment under the 1933 Act.
A. Closed-End Investment Companies.
The Integrated ARROs Funds are two somewhat unique closed-end
investment companies that obtained exemptive relief from several of the
1940 Act's provisions-sections 10(h)(1), 10(h)(2), 14(a), 17(a), 17(d),
and 32(a)--on the basis of their organizational and operational similarity
to UITs. Organized as grantor trusts, like many UITs, each ARROs
Fund had a portfolio consisting of a group of specified real estate lease
related contract rights that cannot change except in the case of a default
or prepayment.234  Under the terms of the offering, the minimum
purchase in an ARROs Fund was $10,000, although the minimum
purchase for an individual retirement account was only $2,000. More-
over, in the initial offering, units were sold only to investors reasonably
believed to have, either individually or in combination with their spouses,
a net worth of $75,000, exclusive of their principal residence. 235
232. Closed-end investment companies differ from UITs principally in that their portfolios are
not fixed but managed, that they have a board of directors, and that they do not issue redeemable
securities. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-5(a)(2) (1982).
233. Section 3(c)(5)(C) of the 1940 Act excepts from the definition of investment company any
company "not engaged in the business of issuing redeemable securities... [that] is primarily en-
gaged in.. . purchasing or otherwise acquiring mortgages and other liens on and interests in real
estate." Id. § 80a-3(c)(5)(C).
234. These contract rights represent amounts payable to the Funds' sponsor from privately of-
fered real estate limited partnerships also organized by the Funds' sponsor. Integrated ARROs
Fund, Investment Company Act Release Nos. 15,492 (Dec. 22, 1986) (notice) & 15,693 (Apr. 21,
1987) (order).
235. Most UITs, on the other hand, are not sold so restrictively, and many rcquire a minimum
investment of only $1000.
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The ARROs Funds sought exemptive relief from section 17(a) of
the 1940 Act so that they could acquire contract rights from their spon-
sor. Section 17(a)(1) of the 1940 Act generally prohibits au affiliated per-
son of an investment company from selling securities or other property to
that company, but section 17(a)(1)(C) excepts from that prohibition a
sale involving solely securities deposited with the trustee of a UIT. The
ARROs Funds asserted that the exception should apply to them because
they, like a UIT, had a fixed portfolio fully identified and priced before
investors purchased their units; thus the potential for abuse present in a
management investment company did not exist.236 It is important to
note that the ARROs Funds did agree to employ an independent evalu-
ator with respect to the sale of the contract rights to the Funds. While
many UITs utilize an independent evaluator, there is no requirement that
the evaluator be independent, and, indeed, some evaluators are affiliated
with the trust whose portfolio they evaluate.
Another "start-up" type of exemption received by the ARROs
Funds involved the minimum capital requirements of section 14(a) of the
1940 Act. While UITs have historically received the exemptive relief
from section 14(a)237 codified in rule 14a-3,2 3s such relief has only been
granted accompanied by certain conditions designed to return money to
the investors if the trust shrinks below a certain size. The ARROs
Funds, however, received unconditional relief from section 14(a). The
ARROs Funds did state that their sponsor would bear all costs of their
organization (which UIT sponsors also bear); the investor presumably
then would not lose those amounts if the funds never got established.
Because the exemptive relief was unconditional, however, the return of
sales load (in this case the underwriting spread) mandated by rule 14a-3
if a trust shrinks below a certain size was not required.
The ARROs Funds also obtained exemptive relief from sections
10(h)(1), 10(h)(2), 16(a), and 32(a) of the 1940 Act, which regnlate cer-
tain aspects of an investment company's board of directors. The funds
successfully argued that these provisions were inapposite to the operation
of an unmanaged, fixed portfolio investment company.
The Commission granted similar exemptive relief in the unusual sit-
uation of the College and University Facility Loan Trust. The College
Trust, which, except for certain limited powers of substitution, has a
fixed portfolio, was organized for the purpose of acquiring certain loans
236. While the justification for the exemptive relief revolved around section 17(a)(1), concerning
the sale to the fund by the affiliate, the exemptive relief given included sections 17(a)(2) and 17(a)(3)
because exemptive relief was granted from all of section 17(a).
237. 15 U.$.C. § 80a-14(a) (1982).
238. 17 C.F.R. § 270.14a-3 (1987).
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from the United States Department of Education in connection with the
federal government's pilot loan asset sale program.239 The trust, like the
ARROs Funds, obtained relief under the 1940 Act from certain provi-
sions affecting closed-end investment companies by asserting that it mer-
ited such relief because of its functional similarity to a UIT.24°
Like the ARROs Funds, the College Trust needed exemptive relief
from section 17(a) of the 1940 Act 241 to acquire its portfolio from the
Department of Education, because the Department's status as either an
"affiliated person" under section 2(a)(3) 242 or a "promoter" under sec-
tion 2(a)(30)243 of the 1940 Act triggered the prohibitions of section
17(a). 244 The College Trust asserted that it deserved this relief in part
because of its similarity to a UIT, which, as noted earlier, enjoys the
section 17(a)(1)(C) statutory exception to the prohibition of section
17(a)(1). To ensure that the price it paid for the loans was fair and rea-
sonable, the College Trust agreed to retain an independent evaluator to
determine the fairness of the consideration paid for the loans.
Although the College Trust received exemptive relief similar to that
received by the ARROs Funds with respect to the 1940 Act provisions
governing management investment companies that are essentially inap-
plicable to an unmanaged company with a fixed portfolio, certain differ-
ences between the College Trust and the ARROs Funds should be noted.
First, because the College Trust had a considerably more complex capital
structure than the ARROs Funds-it was issuing debt securities as well
as equity-it needed exemptive relief from the capital structure and equal
voting provisions of section 18. In seeking such relief, the College Trust
noted that the equal voting rights provision of section 18(i) does not ap-
ply to UITs and that the trust would operate essentially as a UIT. In-
deed, the College Trust could have argued that no portion of section 18
applies to UITs and that, therefore, none of its provisions should apply to
239. Investment Company Act Release Nos. 15,903 (July 31, 1987) (notice) & 15,990 (Sept. 18,
1987) (order). This was a complex exemption, and the application for exemptive relief should be
analyzed in conjunction with the notice. See Application of College and University Facility Loan
Trust, File No. 812-6807. For more information on the federal government's pilot loan asset sale,
see The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 99-509, § 7005, 100 Stat. 1874
(1986).
240. The College Trust received exemptive relief from sections 10(h), 14(a), 16(a), 17(a), 18(a),
18(c), 18(i) and 32(a).
241. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(a).
242. Id. § 80a-2(a)(3).
243. Id. § 80a-2(a)(30).
244. Section 2(a)(3)(F) of the 1940 Act defines the depositor of an unincorporated investment
company not having a board of directors as an "affiliate" of such company. Id. § 80a-2(a)(3)(F).
Section 2(a)(30) of the 1940 Act defines "promoter" of a company as a person who is directing, or
has within one ycar directed, the organization of such company. Id. § 80a-2(a)(30).
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an entity that is essentially a UIT. It bears emphasizing that while cer-
tain provisions of section 18 apply to all management investment compa-
nies, for example, paragraphs (d) and (i), and other provisions affect
either closed- or open-end companies, for example, paragraphs (a), (c),
(e), and (f), no provision of section 18 applies to UITs.
A second distinction between the College Trust and the ARROs
Funds involves section 26. The College Trust agreed to be subject to
most provisions of section 26 of the 1940 Act as though it were a UIT,
but did not agree to be subject to subsections (a)(2)(B) and (C). This
limitation was predicated on the Trust's desire to pay certain closing and
servicing costs, customary with asset-backed financing vehicles, associ-
ated with the loans bought by the Trust. Thus, while the Trust agreed to
be subject to the key UIT provision of the 1940 Act, the exception re-
moved the Trust from one of the integral subprovisions of that provision,
leaving open to question the effectiveness of the agreement. Of course,
the Trust agreed to disclose the closing and servicing costs in its prospec-
tus. In any event, because of the unique nature of the applicants and the
strong public policy reasons for granting exemptive relief, the preceden-
tial value of this exemption granted in connection with the government
loan sales program is probably rather limited.
B. Fixed Portfolio Investment Companies Exempted
From the 1940 Act.
Some fixed portfolio investment vehicles have obtained exemptive
relief from the entire 1940 Act. Of those obtaining such relief, some have
invested their proceeds solely in mortgage-related securities known ge-
nerically as "collateralized mortgage obligations," while others have in-
vested their proceeds in bonds issued by an international financial
institution or foreign government and have issued "stripped" securities
representing interests in the component parts (principal or interest) of
those bonds.
1. Collateralized Mortgage Obligation Trusts. Collateralized
mortgage obligation trnsts (CMO trusts) resemble the traditional Gov-
ernment National Mortgage Association (GNMA) UIT in that both
serve as investment vehicles for investors seeking access to the mortgage
market in a diversified, indirect fashion. In addition, both CMO trnsts
and GNMA UITs are often created with a bank acting as trustee.2 45 Yet
245. See, e.g., Triad Mortgage Acceptance Corp., Investment Company Act Release Nos. 15,904
(July 31, 1987) (notice) & 15,956 (Sept. 1, 1987) (order) [hereinafter Triad Releases]; CityFed Fund-
ing Corp., Investment Company Act Release Nos. 15,795 (June 10, 1987) (notice) & 15,857 (July 2,
1987) (order) [hereinafter CityFed Releases].
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there are differences between the two. An interest in a GINMA UIT is an
equity interest in a pool of GNMA certificates, whereas the interests sold
in a CMO trust are generally debt interests-bonds secured by various
types of mortgage interests. This distinction has blurred, however, as
CMO trusts have begun to sell not only bonds, but also the equity
residual interests in themselves to institutional investors. Another differ-
ence is that CMO trusts, unlike UITs, do not issue redeemable securities.
A third and critical distinction hes in the varying degree to which
these companies maintain a fixed portfolio. As a result of the definition
of a UIT, the staff of the Commission believes that substitution within
the portfolio of a UIT can only occur under extraordinary circum-
stances-circumstances indicating that the creditworthiness or economic
viability of the issuer of the portfolio security is seriously in doubt.246
This interpretation ensures that a UIT will retain its fixed nature. CMO
trusts, on the other hand, are only moderately fixed in comparison.
While eliminated portfolio securities must be replaced by mortgage se-
curities of equal or better quality with similar payment terms and cash
flow, as much as forty percent of the aggregate face amount of the portfo-
lio securities initially purchased may be substituted; in no event, how-
ever, may any new portfolio security be substituted for any substituted
security.247
Although the investors in a CMO trust exempted from all provi-
sions of the 1940 Act may not enjoy the same protections as investors in
a UIT, they are not left unprotected. The Commission has attached sev-
eral conditions to the exemptive relief it has granted CMO trusts. It has
required (1) that custody of the CMO trust's assets rest with an entity
unaffiliated 248 with the sponsor; (2) that an independent public account-
ant annually audit the books and records of the trust; and (3) that any
offering of equity interests not constitute a public offering within the
meaning of section 4(2) of the 1933 Act,249 and result in no more than
100 beneficial owners.250
Approximately 120 UIT series invest in GNMAs and have over $2.5 billion in assets. Only 82
GNMA UIT series with less than $2 billion in assets existed a year ago. INVESTMENT CO. INST.,
REPORT ON TOTAL OUTSTANDING UNIT INVESTMENT TRUSTS FOR THE YEAR 1985 (1986).
246. Paine Webber Equity Trust, Growth Stock Series (pub. avail. Sept. 24, 1986); Release 6693,
supra note 111, at 88,563.
247. See, eg., Triad Releases, supra note 245; CityFed Releases, supra note 245.
248. Rule 405 under the 1933 Act, 17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (1987), not section 2(a)(3) of the 1940
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(3) (1982), defines "affiliate" in these exemptive applications.
249. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1982).
250. See, eg., Triad Releases, supra note 245; CityFed Releases, supra note 245. Another condi-
tion to obtaining exemptive relief requires a CMO trust that is issuing bonds to register the bonds
under the 1933 Act unless they are exempt from registration pursuant to section 4(2) of that Act.
This condition is not particularly onerous, however, since it prohibits only certain "limited offers"
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1 2. "Stripped" Securities Companies. Several major investment
bankers have recently obtained exemptive relief from the entire 1940 Act
in conjunction with their offering of "stripped" securities, that is, the
component parts of interest-bearing bonds issued by an international fi-
nancial institution such as the World Bank, or by a foreign govern-
ment.251 These investment bankers have asserted that the potential
investment companies would increase liquidity by providing a more flexi-
ble market for debt securities issued by foreign governments and interna-
tional financial institutions.
Several similarities between these types of potential investment com-
panies and UITs exist. First, the selection of the stripped portfolio secur-
ities is made before the sale of interests in the stripped securities and, as
with UITs, investors know exactly what they are purchasing. Second,
although they are not required to do so, the investment bankers state that
they expect to maintain a secondary market in the securities they issue.
Third, the investment bankers sponsoring the potential investment com-
pany purchase the bonds that constitute the portfolio securities and de-
posit them with a bank. Finally, the portfolio securities acquired by the
potential investment company are held by a bank pursuant to a custody
agreement meeting the requirements imposed upon UITs by section
26(a) of the 1940 Act.
Despite these similarities, two integral differences between
"stripped" securities companies and UITs exist. As with the CMO
trusts, the stripped securities companies do not issue redeemable securi-
ties. Furthermore, the securities issued by these companies are sold only
to institutional investors who meet the definition of "accredited investor"
under Regulation D of the 1933 Act252 and who have sufficient knowl-
edge and experience to evaluate the risks associated with investing in se-
curities representing interests in the principal or interest payments of the
underlying bonds. This institutional investor limitation has allowed ap-
plicants to assert that their proposed transaction are not of the type that
need to be regulated under the 1940 Act.
governed by rules 504 and 505 of regulation D. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.504-.505 (1987). The restric-
tions on a CMO trust's equity offering apparently emanate from the provisions of section 3(c)(1) of
the 1940 Act, which excepts from the definition of investment company "[a]ny issuer whose out-
standing securities... are beneficially owned by not more than one hundred persons and which is
not making and does not presently propose to make a public offering of its securities." 15 U.S.C.
§ 80a-3(c)(l) (1982).
251. Kidder, Peabody & Co., Investment Company Act Release Nos. 15,801, 52 Fed. Reg.
23,236 (June 11, 1987) (notice) & 15,861 (July 2, 1987) (order); Shearson Lehman Bros., Investment
Company Act Release Nos. 15,799, 52 Fed. Reg. 23,244 (June 11, 1987) (notice) & 15,860 (July 2,
1987) (order).
252. Rule 501 of regulation D defines the term "accredited investor." 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)
(1987).
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C. Section 3(c)(5)(C) Companies.
Some fixed portfolio investment companies fall within section
3(c)(5)(C)'s protection. That provision excepts from the definition of in-
vestment company all issuers that do not issue redeemable securities and
that are primarily engaged in purchasing or otherwise acquiring mort-
gages or other interests in real estate. Such issuers are thus not subject to
the 1940 Act and need not go through the exemptive process to attain
such status. They differ from UITs principally because they cannot issue
redeemable securities, although, like UITs, they can make a secondary
market in their shares. The prohibition on issuing redeemable securities
was not always part of section 3(c)(5)(C). In fact, it only became part of
that section as a result of the 1970 amendments to the 1940 Act, which
extended the coverage of the 1940 Act to issuers seeking to capitalize on
the popularity of mutual funds.25 3 A second, pragmatic difference be-
tween section 3(c)(5)(C) companies and UITs is that UITs investing in
real estate tend to do so through GNMA and other government-backed
securities, while section 3(c)(5)(C) companies tend to invest in a wide
variety of other types of real estate interests, including leasehold interests
in real estate and construction period mortgage loans.2 54
Despite these differences, a company excepted from the 1940 Act
through section 3(c)(5)(C) can closely resemble a UIT that invests in
mortgages. The provision in section 3(c)(5)(C) that requires the com-
pany to be "primarily engaged" in the business of purchasing or other-
wise acquiring real estate interests does not require that such a company
actively manage its portfolio. In fact, such a company can be a passive,
fixed investment trust without employees, officers, an investment adviser,
or a board of directors.255
The contours of section 3(c)(5)(C) have been extensively probed, es-
pecially over the last decade. While the redeemable securities element
has not received a great deal of scrutiny, the "primarily engaged" and the
"mortgages and other liens on or interests in real estate" requirements
have received much attention. While the staff of the Commission used to
interpret the "primarily engaged" provision as requiring at least sixty-
five percent of a company's assets to consist of real estate interests, it has
moved to a fifty-five percent requirement.25 6 Recently, the staff of the
253. See S. REP. No. 184, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 37 (1969), reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONrG. &
ADMIN. NEWS, 4897, 4932-33 (discussing section 3(c)(6) which was later redesignated section
3(c)(5); H.R. REP. No. 1382, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1970).
254. Health Facility Credit Corp. (pub. avail. Feb. 6, 1985); Northwestern Ohio Building &
Construction Trades Foundation (pub. avail. May 21, 1984).
255. McDonald & Company Securities, Inc. (pub. avail. Dec. 14, 1983).
256. Salomon Brothers Mortgage Securities, Inc. (pub. avail. Nov. 8, 1983).
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Commission has begun to require that the remaining forty-five percent of
the company's assets consist primarily of real estate related invest-
ments.257 The "mortgages or other interests in real estate" requirement
has received scrutiny as intense as that given any other element of section
3(c)(5)(C). The staff of the Commission, for instance, decided that
GNMA, Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA), or Federal
Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC) certificates comprising an
undivided interest in the entire pool of mortgages backing the certificates
(whole-pool certificates) qualify under section 3(c)(5)(C),258 but that the
same certificates representing a proportionate interest in a pool of mort-
gages (partial-pool certificates) do not.259
D. The 1933 Act and Mortgage Securities.
While many UITs qualify for liberalized registration treatment
under the 1933 Act as a result of rule 487260 irrespective of whether they
invest in mortgage-related securities, certain fixed portfolio companies
not subject to the 1940 Act may qualify for the liberalized registration
treatment afforded by rule 415 of the 1933 Act 261-the shelf-registration
rule-if they invest in mortgage-related securities. When adopted on a
temporary basis in 1982,262 rule 415 did not explicitly extend relief to
mortgage-related securities. When adopted on a permanent basis, eight-
een months later,263 rule 415 contained a provision explicitly providing
shelf registration for such securities.264 The release adopting the final
rule stated that mortgage-related securities, such as mortgage-backed
debt and mortgage participation or pass-through certificates, previously
had been eligible for shelf registration under a more general provision of
the rule.
The shelf-registration rule explicitly excludes UITs (and mutual
257. Salomon Brothers Mortgage Securities, Inc. (pub. avail. June 16, 1985).
258. Landmark Funding (pub. avail. Sept. 20, 1984); Equibank (pub. avail. Aug. 29, 1983);
American Home Finance Mortgage Corp. (pub. avail. May 11, 1981).
259. Nottingham Realty Securities, Inc. (pub. avail. Apr. 19, 1984); Arlington Investment Co.
(pub. avail. Aug. 31, 1974).
260. 17 C.F.R. § 230.487 (1987).
261. Id. § 230.415.
262. Securities Act Release No. 6383 (Mar. 2, 1982).
263. Shelf Registration, Securities Act Release No. 6499, [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCHi) 83,449, at 86,335 (Nov. 17, 1983) [hereinafter Release 6499]. The Secondary
Mortgage Market Enhancement Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-440, 98 Stat. 1689, would have re-
qnired the Commission to provide a permanent shelf registration procedure for mortgage-backed
securities, but that requirement was eliminated as a result of the adoption, on a permanent basis, of
rule 415. HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, SECONDARY MORTGAGE MARKET EN-
HANCEMENT ACT OF 1983, H.R. REP. No. 98-994, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1984).
264. 17 C.F.R. § 230.415(a)(1)(vii) (1987); see Release 6499, supra note 263, at 86,342.
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funds) registered under the 1940 Act from its provisions;2 65 therefore,
fixed portfolio investment vehicles seeking to rely on rule 415 must avoid
being subject to the 1940 Act by, for example, structuring themselves to
come within section 3(c)(5)(C) of that act or obtaining exemptive relief
pursuant to section 6(c). Because the rule was modified to permit reli-
ance upon it by closed-end investment companies, 266 fixed portfolio in-
vestment vehicles like the ARROs Funds could have relied upon it.
The significance of rule 415 is that, like rule 487, it gives issuers
control over when offerings are brought to market and allows them to
comply with 1933 Act registration requirements while basing their deci-
sions on market and business factors rather than Commission processing
schedules. A fixed portfolio company investing in mortgages or mort-
gage-related securities (an MRS issuer) can register a large quantity of
securities by using a registration statement containing what is referred to
as a "core prospectus." The core prospectus contains disclosures about
each possible type of mortgage that could form part of a pool to be of-
fered. It is supplemented by an offering-specific document that contains
more detail about the particular offering being made through that docu-
ment, such as the type, yield, and maturity of the mortgages comprising
the pool. The offering-specific document together with the core prospec-
tus make up the preliminary prospectus used to solicit indications of in-
terest in a specific offering. The MRS issuer generally solicits interest in
a specific shelf offering without first assembling the portfolio of mort-
gage-related securities. Indeed, although investors know what type of
mortgage-related security the issuer intends to purchase with the pro-
ceeds, it is not necessary for the mortgages to be purchased before the
securities are sold;267 moreover, the offering-specific document does not
identify specific mortgages or mortgage-related securities. Investors thus
purchase interests in an unidentified pool of mortgages.268
Aside from the fact that a rule 487 offering is regulated by the 1940
Act, fixed portfolio offerings registered under rule 415 differ from those
filed under rule 487 in two respects. First, when a UIT sponsor
designates a time and date for the effectiveness of its registration state-
ment under rule 487, the filing that becomes effective must contain a
portfolio of specified securities. The very essence of a UIT, in fact, in-
volves an investor who "exercises his own judgment, because he is ordi-
265. 17 C.F.R. § 230.415(b) (1987).
266. Securities Act Release No. 6334, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) No. 926 (Second Extra Edition)
(Aug. 13, 1981).
267. Release 6499, supra note 263, at 86,342.
268. Release 6693, supra note 111, at 88,561.
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narily shown the list of securities in which his funds will be invested. '269
This, of course, differs fundamentally from the situation with MRS issu-
ers, who do not identify specific mortgage-related securities in their offer-
ing documents. Second, under rule 487, each series of a UIT as well as
the UIT sponsor is a separate issuer under the 1933 Act.270 Under rule
415, however, the securities offered under a shelf registration are in most
instances issued by a single issuer.271 This distinction is significant not
only because under rule 487 there exist two potentially liable issuers-the
series and its sponsor-in contrast to the single issuer under rule 415, but
because of its implications for the entire registration process. Since each
series is considered a separate issuer, each series must be offered pursuant
to its own prospectus, a prospectus that must be kept current under sec-
tion 10(a)(3) of the 1933 Act because the sponsor of the series generally
makes a secondary market in units of the series.
CONCLUSION
UITs have emerged as a popular consumer investment. Like their
fixed trust predecessors, a UIT offers an alteruative to mutual funds and
other managed investment vehicles. Like a mutual fund, a UIT offers
diversity at an affordable price. Unlike a mutual fund, however, a UIT
offers certainty: an investor in a UIT knows what securities his UIT
owns and will always own-subject only to limited substitution and elim-
ination powers-before he purchases shares in the UIT. Because of its
relatively fixed nature, the UIT seems to be most useful as a vehicle for
efficiently investing in debt securities. Thus, as long as debt securities are
attractive investments, UITs should remain popular. The other fixed
portfolio investment vehicles may be aberrational, although the ones in-
vesting in real estate and mortgage-backed securities seem somewhat
entrenched.
The growing popularity of UITs has not gone unnoticed. The bank-
ing industry has quietly gotten involved as more than just the trustee to
UITs, and the Chairman of the Commission recently specified the under-
writing of UITs as a potential bank activity that would have to come
under SEC jurisdiction as a result of any legislation expanding the per-
269. Hearings 3580, supra note 7, at 300.
270. Release 6401, supra note 100, at 85,060.
271. Certain MRS issuers use rule 415 to make periodic offerings of securities where each offer-
ing involves the creation of a discrete trust containing the pool of securities to be offered. For the
purpose of reporting under the 1934 Act, each trust files as a separate issuer. While each offering
proceeds through the use of a prospectus filed under rule 424, 17 C.F.R. § 230.424 (1987), without a
new 1933 Act registration statement identifying the new trust as an issuer, it could be asserted that
each trust is a separate issuer under the 1933 Act as well, see Release 6693, supra note 111, at
88,560-61.
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missible securities activities of banks.272 In addition to the UIT's grow-
ing popularity with consumers and with the financial services industry,
the evolution of the securities laws and regulations affecting UITs de-
serves careful attention. The treatment of UITs under the 1933 and 1940
Acts has undergone the most dramatic changes with respect to registra-
tion provisions, but treatment under the regulatory provisions of the
1940 Act has changed as well. Further changes in the legal landscape
seem imminent, particularly in the area of registration forms and rules.
272. Ruder Shifts Stance on Banks'Role in Brokerage, Am. Banker, Dec. 3, 1987, at 1, col. 2 &
30, col. 4.
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